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Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelagic country, with more than 13,466 islands 
spread from west to east (Bakohumas, 2012). It consists of several important sea lines of 
communication (SLOC) (Koh, 2008) that connect the Indian and the Pacific oceans, which are 
vital for global maritime navigation. These SLOCs are the shipping routes for a large portion of 
world trade. In addition, the abundant natural resources of the maritime domain and the 
country’s strategic position have given Indonesia great economic and strategic benefits. 
This geographical position, while putting Indonesia in a highly strategic location, also 
exposes the nation to maritime threats, such as illegal logging and fishing, smuggling, human 
trafficking, drug trafficking, and territorial breaches that affect its security policies. With three 
quarters of Indonesia’s territory maritime-based, the Indonesian government is searching for 
better ways to address these menaces in order to protect the country’s national security. 
However, the presence of the waters between and around the islands within the archipelago 
creates enormous practical difficulties in terms of maritime governance (Cribb & Ford, 2009).   
A. BACKGROUND 
The maritime domain is, by definition, a multidimensional environment, made more 
complex in Indonesia’s case due to the wide expanse of its territory and the multitude of inter-
island waterways that must be monitored and controlled to provide security for the domain. 
One does not have the privilege to separate the governance based on region as one would on 
the land. In contrast with land governance that can mark a clear border and build an installation 
to assist with the governance, the physical fluidity of the sea contributes to the complexity of 
maritime governance. Maritime governance must take into account the presence of a multi-
layered region of the sea—the air column, surface, water column, seabed, and subsoil—all at 
once in a single maritime location (Cribb & Ford, 2009, p. 13). The complexity of the maritime 
domain in Indonesia also involves numerous cultural groupings along with local wisdom that 
are spread throughout the Indonesian archipelago. These differences affect the maritime 
governance process as an integrated maritime security system.  
The Indonesian government’s response to these problems initially was 
organizational—to establish many different maritime agencies to govern the maritime territory 
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and provide maritime security and defense. When coordination among these agencies became 
difficult, the government reestablished the Maritime Security Coordinating Board in 2005, a 
board that had been dormant since 1972. The government realized that Indonesia needed a fully 
functioning body to coordinate the governance of maritime security. The Presidential Decree 
No.81/2005 on December 29, 2005 (Perpres, 2005) reestablished the body with the name of 
Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board (IMSCB) (Sumaryono, 2009, p. 135). The 
main task of this body was to set up a comprehensive and integrated maritime security system 
to perform maritime governance. IMSCB has five specific tasks (Sumaryono, 2009, p. 138): 
1. Formulate a general policy on maritime security; 
2. Coordinate maritime security operations in Indonesian waters; 
3. Provide technical and administrative support for maritime security; 
4. Provide assistance in maritime security institutional capacity building; and 
5. Encourage stakeholder engagement in ensuring maritime security.    
The Presidential Decree No.81/2005 (Perpres, 2005) acts as the legislative basis for the 
operation that is carried out by IMSCB along with other government agencies that have field 
resources in the maritime domain. The coordination effort is under the supervision of IMSCB.  
The Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board (IMSCB) has 12 actively 
participating agencies, although only six of them have resources in the field in the form of 
office branches, ships, surveillance equipment, and personnel. These agencies are: the 
Indonesian Navy, KPLP (“Kesatuan Penjaga Laut dan Pantai” – Coastal Guard and Security 
Unit); the Customs; the Fisheries Department; and the Marine Police. These agencies have 
authorities that span the spectrum from law enforcement at sea to the maritime management of 
resources and port authority. They also handle tasks in accordance with their specific mandates 
in different sectors within the maritime domain.  
Despite these efforts, progress on the integration of the domain appears to have stalled. 
Contradictory mandates among agencies in the maritime domain and the overlapping 
jurisdictions in the practical application of law enforcement at sea still exist. For example, 
KPLP and IMSCB are competing for acknowledgement by the government and other maritime 
authorities as the ‘genuine’ Coast Guard. Each agency continues to look for more authority, 
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resources, and privileges from the government (Supriyanto, 2013). The Ministry of 
Transportation with its KPLP (Kesatuan Penjaga Laut dan Pantai – Coastal Guard and Security 
Unit) interprets the Governmental Decree No.17/2008 (Undang-undang, 2008) as being in 
favor of the Indonesian Sea and Coast Guard (ISCG) under the authority of Ministry of 
Transportation. Meanwhile, the Ministry for Politics, Law, and Security (Kemkopolhukam) has 
rebuffed that notion by holding that the Presidential Decree No.81/2005 means that the IMSCB 
is the sole institution to hold the ISCG’s mandates.  
This self-defeating competition is due in large part to contradictory legislation and 
authority that cross jurisdictional lines in the field. A case in point is the question of jurisdiction 
in investigating the violation of fisheries regulation based on the governmental Decree 
No.31/2004 (Undang-undang, 2004). It gives investigative jurisdiction to three agencies – the 
navy, the marine police, and the fisheries investigator. These overlapping authorities weaken 
coordinated maritime governance in Indonesia and cause confusion for the maritime users due 
to competing bureaucracy. Without clear and definitive legislative guidance, each agency has 
its “own” legislation to back its respective authorities and each continues to resist coordination 
for fear of giving away its authorities and privileges. Maritime agencies end up being reluctant 
to share their information and instead retain it for internal consumption, further hindering inter-
agency coordination. This lack of information-sharing ends up creating different interpretations 
of the same maritime security problem. So, for example, the navy, marine police, and IMSCB 
all have their own information gathering centers with the ability to collect data on crime and 
robbery occurrences at sea. However, information among them is not shared, making data 
synchronization impossible. Unsynchronized data then produce different analyses about crime 
and robbery in the maritime domain and eventually create confusion for decision-making 
authorities when developing maritime policies. 
The inter-agency competition and battle for preeminence overshadows the goal of 
coordination and the recognition of shared purpose among the maritime stakeholders. It is 
difficult for them to see what is at stake for the whole domain. They have no common ground 
on which to work together in an integrated system, which further complicates the IMSCB’s 
charge. Instead, the current condition of the Indonesian Maritime Domain can be likened to 
anarchy—a state of disorder characterized by the absence of overarching authority to provide 
communication, coordination, and mutual support among countless autonomous actors who 
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operate without formal connections or fixed boundaries (Gordon, 2008, p. 14). The efforts of 
each agency remain parochial. Attempts to resolve mutual problems and issues are not 
occurring because each agency only works to solve problems included within its own mandates 
and responsibilities.  
Even if the Indonesian government were able to eliminate the conflicting legislation 
and bestow more authority on the IMSCB, given the vastness of the archipelago and the limited 
funding and insufficient resources, a single agency, even with proper authority to govern the 
vast domain, is unlikely to effectively and efficiently cover the whole maritime area. We 
believe a plausible option is the redesign the inter-organizational network to address and 
mitigate the anarchic conditions in the maritime domain. Before exploring the design options, 
we offer a brief description of the current inter-organizational network. The remaining chapters 
of this thesis will explore some design options for the inter-organizational network with the 
goal of providing better governance and unity of effort for Indonesia’s maritime domain.  
B. IMSCB’S CURRENT INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORK 
The Indonesian government is attempting to govern its maritime domain in the vast 
archipelago. Indonesian Presidential Decree No.81/2005 established IMSCB’s roles in the 
maritime domain and established a network of agencies and organizations to work together to 
reach their common goal. Despite the lack of recognition on the common purpose for the 
stakeholders and the difficulties in information sharing within the network, this is an initial 
effort by the IMSCB to coordinate the effort of all of the agencies in the Indonesian maritime 
domain.  
Figure 1 is the network diagram of IMSCB within the government in accordance with 
the Presidential Decree No.81/2005. It illustrates the existing complex network of 
governmental maritime agencies responsible for administering control over the archipelago’s 




Figure 1.  IMSCB’s government network diagram.  
The IMSB, in the center of the network diagram, is the sole institution with the 
legitimate authority to coordinate and endorse coordination among all maritime resources. The 
head of IMSCB is the Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Law, and Security 
(Kemkopolhukam), while there are 12 members of the IMSCB as the government 
stakeholders: 
1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu) 
2. Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemdagri) 
3. Ministry of Defense (Kemhan) 
4. Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (Kemkumham) 
5. Ministry of Finance (Kemkeu) 
6. Ministry of Transportation (Kemhub) 
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7. Ministry of Sea and Fisheries  
8. Attorney General of Republic of Indonesia (Kejakgung RI) 
9. Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) 
10. Republic of Indonesia Police (Polri) 
11. State Intelligence Agency (BIN) 
12. Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) 
Besides these 12 members of IMSCB, there is also the secretary of IMSCB who serves 
as the Chief Executive of IMSCB and is responsible for the implementation of IMSCB’s tasks, 
administration, and technical functions on a daily basis. The chief directly reports to the 
Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law, and Security. 
In order to perform daily functions, the chief executive is assisted by the Sea Security 
Coordination Team. This team consists of the first-echelon representatives from each of the 
institutions being represented as members of IMSCB. They are:  
1. Director General of Law and International Agreement, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
2. Director General of General Government, Ministry of Home Affairs. 
3. Expert Staff of the Minister of Defense on Security Affairs. 
4. Director General of Immigration, Ministry of Justice and Human Rights   
5. Director General of Customs, Ministry of Finance. 
6. Director General of Sea Transportation, Ministry of Transportation. 
7. Director General Sea and Fisheries Resources Supervision, Ministry of 
Sea and Fisheries. 
8. Junior Attorney General for Intelligence. 
9. Chief of Operational Staff of Chief of General Staff Indonesian Armed 
Forces. 
10. Deputy Head of Police Security Agency.  
11. Expert Staff on Law for the State Intelligence Agency. 
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12. Chief of Operational Staff of Navy Chief of Staff. 
This team prepares the planning of general policy on the subject of maritime security 
and also to plan, monitor, and evaluate the coordination execution of the maritime security 
operation (Perpres, 2005).     
The purpose of the current network depicted in Figure 1 is to govern the Indonesian 
maritime domain by involving all government stakeholders. The network itself is a closed 
system that consists only of the government institutions that have the authority over the 
maritime issues. It does not include other stakeholders, such a private companies, in the 
maritime domain. 
In principle, the IMSCB is the administrator of the overall network activities and is 
central to its coordination. The pattern of interactions of the inter-organizational network is 
similar to a “Hub and Spoke” structure (Anklam, 2007). The central hub is IMSCB which 
connects all the government stakeholders within the maritime domain, and all stakeholders 
must go through IMSB in order to link with other stakeholders. In practice, however, the inter-
organizational network overseen by the IMSCB appears to operating more like anarchy with its 
attendant challenges and limitations.   
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT    
The Indonesian government attempted to address the maritime domain’s coordination 
challenges with the reestablishment of IMSCB as a coordinating body. Yet, the IMSCB’s 
subsequent coordination efforts among maritime agencies have not been successful. Although 
on paper it has an overarching authority, in practice the IMSCB lacks authority to establish 
common purpose, coordinate activities, and develop operational processes, such as 
communication and information, to integrate the network as a whole. The current inter-
organizational network arrangement produces conditions that are closer to anarchy rather than a 
system of integrated, collaborative governance.     
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question of this thesis is how to improve inter-organization coordination 
in Indonesia’s maritime domain especially as it pertains to network governance and operational 
deployment patterns to ensure maritime security?  
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E. THESIS STRUCTURE  
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter I presents the background for the capstone 
project by explaining the background and current situation and conditions that are present in the 
Indonesian maritime domain. The chapter offers alternative inter-organizational network 
designs that attempt to correct for the deficiencies in the current design. A review of all the 
relevant network theories and literature is presented in Chapter II, while Chapter III describes 
the research methodologies employed in this project:  geospatial analysis; social network 
analysis; and temporal analysis. The results from these analyses are presented in Chapter IV. 
Following this analysis, Chapter V presents an alternative network design to address 
the problems inherent in the current inter-organizational design of Indonesia’s maritime 
domain. Finally, Chapter VI reviews the results of the research. It concludes the thesis and 
offers what we believe is a reasonable and plausible solution to current problems in 







II. LITERATURE REVIEW: INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL 
NETWORKS 
This chapter addresses basic questions about networks. What are they? How are they 
created and designed? What purposes do they serve? How can we evaluate their performance 
and effectiveness? And, how can we facilitate inter-organizational network coordination to 
improve their performance? Furthermore, this chapter recognizes the implementation of inter-
organizational networks in many fields that could be the source of ideas for the Indonesian 
maritime network improvement. 
A. GENERAL NETWORK TERMS 
Networks are formed from the relationships among actors, be they individuals, 
organizations, or even nations. O’Toole (1997) defines networks as the structure of 
interdependence involving multiple organizations that are bonded by ties of authority bonds, 
exchange relations, and form coalitions based on common interest in a single structure. 
Expanding on this definition, McGuire (2003) considers networks as structures that involve 
multiple nodes of agencies or organizations with multiple linkages. The structures could be 
formal or informal, and are typically intersectoral or intergovernmental. Furthermore, Agranoff 
(2004) describes networks in public organizations as a structure composed of governmental and 
nongovernmental agencies working together to exchange information and formulate and 
implement policies.   
Networks can be formed out of numerous types of relationships. Borgatti et al. (2013) 
explain that there can be multiple relationships in a single network. Each of relationship type 
determines the corresponding network. For example, measuring friendship ties will result in a 
friendship network. Likewise, measuring family ties will present in a family network. 
Furthermore, analysis of a network can combine the ties in various ways depending on the 
requirement. Borgatti argues that networks can be grouped into two categories (pp. 3‒5). They 
are personal ties signifying inter-personal relationships and acquaintanceship ties that refer to 
the relations among organizations on a large scale. 
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1. Network Types 
Milward and Provan (2006) explain the types of networks as fundamental to the 
understanding of network management. They describe four types of public networks that 
consist of service implementation networks, information diffusion networks, problem-solving 
networks, and community capacity building networks.  
Service implementation networks normally provide services as the result of the 
collaboration of two or more organizations that provide joint services. This type of network 
utilizes horizontal management of service providers in the forms of firms, nonprofits, or 
government agencies. 
Information diffusion networks primarily focus on information sharing across the 
departmental boundaries with horizontal and vertical ties among interdependent governmental 
agencies. 
Problem-solving networks have the primary purpose of solving existing complex 
problems, such as the one addressed in this thesis. This type of network often builds on the 
temporary information diffusion networks that become dormant after the problem is resolved. 
Community capacity building networks have the goal of building social capital in 
community-based settings. These networks, which are present and future oriented, normally 
involve a wide range of agencies to address any problem that may arise in a community.  
Literature on networks commonly describes three central functions: information 
diffusion and knowledge exchange, network learning, and innovation (Popp et al. 2013, p. 8). 
However, a network that has a primary function, such as service-provider network, also will 
develop multiple functions in information sharing and knowledge exchange, learning, and 
capacity-building.  
2. Network Structure 
Anklam (2007) describes network structure as the most tangible property of a network. 
Anklam explains that network structures have some distinctive patterns although variation in 
structure is infinite. The basic patterns are: centralized structure; mesh; hub-and spoke; clusters; 
and core/periphery.  
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Centralized structure is a pattern that disseminates authority from a single person on 
the top or center of the network structure through a structured series of subgroups (Anklam, 
2007, p. 53). In this pattern, the nodes are connected by a relationship that a node in the 
top/center of the structure leads (see Figure 2). Both of the network structure in Figure 2 are the 
same and depict the same network structure.   
            or   
Figure 2.  Centralized structure. 
 
Mesh is a network structure in which the connection among nodes is equal to every 
other node (see Figure 3). This pattern signifies a close-knit entity (Anklam, 2007, p. 54).  
 
 
Figure 3.  Mesh structure. 
Hub-and-Spoke has a star or starburst structure (see Figure 4). The hub is the central 
connector node among spokes within a network.  
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Figure 4.  Hub-and-spoke structure. 
Clusters are connected or isolated groups of nodes within a network structure. The 
presence of clusters could indicate the emergence of small groups within a network (see Figure 
5). 
 
Figure 5.  Cluster structure  
Core/Periphery structure is a group of highly connected nodes in the middle of the 
structure that are connected to other nodes in the periphery of the network. The blue nodes in 




Figure 6.  Core/Periphery structure (Sherman, 2008).  
Social network analysis metrics are the measurement tools used to describe network 
structures that are difficult to discern with the naked eye. These metrics, and others drawn from 
social network analysis, are powerful tools to analyze network structures and their relational 
ties.    
3. Network Evolution 
Anklam (2007) describes a network’s evolution over time. In Figure 7, she divides the 
growth model for a network’s five phases: initiation, purpose, organize, grow, and perform.  
 
Figure 7.  Growth model of a network (Anklam, 2007, p.133). 
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1. Social actors initiate or begin networks either through intent or discovery. 
Intent means that the network was initiated through the intention of one or 
more entities that already have a clear purpose for the network’s 
establishment. On the other hand, discovery means that the network was 
discovered through the process of interaction among entities that then 
surfaced similar ideas and purposes that led to network formation. 
2. Network purpose is what the network hopes to achieve. It is the 
foundation of a network. The purpose then drives more specific details of 
a network’s design. 
3. Networks organize by identifying members and strengthening their 
relationships. The network also organizes by finding and evolving suitable 
structures and governance models (see Section B), establishing norms of 
participation, and setting up the network’s pace and routines to get work 
done.    
4. During the growth phase, the network builds additional capabilities to 
develop and support tasks necessary to achieve its goals. Particular 
attention is paid to how members are working together to reinforce core 
values and network purpose. 
5. In the performance phase, networks monitor their outputs and outcomes to 
determine how effective and efficient they are in achieving their purpose. 
Monitoring key relationships in the external environment is essential to 
this effort. As the environment changes, the network must adapt. 
However, as Anklam notes, network growth does not follow a steady 
progression through all five phases. Setbacks and disturbances are 
expected as illustrated by the arrows heading leftward from the perform 
phase in Figure 7. Although movement is considered to be natural for 
long-lived networks, not all networks are able to make dynamic changes 
needed to sustain their activities over time. 
B. INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS 
Provan, Fish, and Sydow (2007) consider the inter-organizational network to be the 
“whole network” that consists of multiple organizations linked through multifaceted ties. The 
term ‘whole’ refers to a network consisting of three or more organizations connected to support 
the whole network’s goals. Based on their 20 years studying inter-organizational networks, the 
authors focus on three key elements:  network governance, network leadership and 
management, and network performance. 
Network governance is the coordination mechanism of a network that focuses on the 
network as the unit of analysis in order to guide the network in a steady state (Kenis & Provan, 
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2005). Kenis and Provan (2005) introduce the typology illustrated in Figure 8 to distinguish 
among the three modes of network governance:  self-governance, lead organization 
governance, and network administrative organization (NAO) governance. Self-governance, or 
“shared governance,” is the most common and involves all network members in active network 
management and decision making. It is characterized by small numbers of members in a 
decentralized network structure. Its advantages lie in the ease of its formation and high levels of 
commitment. Its disadvantages lie in frequent meetings, the lack of clear goals, and the 
challenges of reaching consensus on network issues. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Modes of network governance (Provan & Kenis, 2005). 
As networks increase in size and complexity, they move toward the other two 
governance modes: the lead organization or the NAO mode. The lead organization identifies 
one of the more powerful organizations with sufficient resources and legitimacy to assume the 
administrative burden for the inter-organizational network. The advantage of this mode is the 
efficiency of clear network direction and management. The disadvantages are the potential for 
lead organization domination and the low participation from the members. 
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The third governance mode is NAO. It is similar to the lead organization but with one 
exception. In the NAO, an organizational entity is created to oversee and manage the whole 
network. It attends only to administration functions and network management. It does not get 
involved in the provision of services as other network members do. However, the NAO form 
also has the disadvantages of higher operation costs, a more complex administration process, 
and a potential loss of control and decision authority for some network members.  
Network leadership and management is described by Milward and Provan (2006) as 
providing a task framework to guide inter-organization network leaders and managers in inter-
organizational networks no matter what governance mode they choose. The five tasks within 
this framework are:   
 Management of Accountability. This task identifies who is responsible for 
what to ensure everyone in the network is doing their tasks accordingly. 
Moreover, the task is also to avoid any free riders within the network. At 
the individual organization level, the managers are to ensure the 
contribution of their respective organizations to the network through 
activities and resources. 
 Management of Legitimacy. This task convinces the stakeholders that the 
network is functioning as intended and is adding value from their 
perspectives. The legitimacy of network performance is intended to attract 
positive publicity, resources, and new members. At the organization level, 
the manager in the network is to demonstrate the value of participation and 
legitimize the role of organization among the members. 
 Management of Conflict. The task identifies tensions in the network and 
search for ways to address and solve them. In order to reduce tensions 
within the network, the manager of the network should act as the “good 
faith” broker. In individual organizations, the task resolves problems with 
individual network members and acts as a link in order to balance between 
organization and network.   
 Management of Governance. This task sets up decision making for the 
network and ensures that interests of network members are represented. It 
determines the proper structure for the network governance and then 
implements and manages the structure. At the individual organization 
level, the task is to work effectively based on the network structure. 
 Management of Commitment. The task builds network loyalty and support 
and sustains them over time by informing network participants of all the 
activities and distributing network resources equitably. At the organization 
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level, the task is to build commitment from within the organization to 
support network’s goals. 
Network performance is the achievement of the positive level of network outcomes that 
cannot be attained by one member working alone (Popp et al. 2013, p. 10). It only can be 
attained with unity of effort among all network members. Despite claims to the contrary, 
networks do not always produce positive outcomes and some even fail. Their sustainability and 
outcomes, as Human and Provan (2000) have found, depend on external and internal 
legitimacy and support, especially during a network’s early stages of evolution. Thus, Provan 
and Milward (2001) underscore the importance of evaluating the effectiveness of inter-
organizational networks. All network members, especially those who are allocated scarce 
public funding, need to demonstrate they are utilizing resources efficiently and effectively to 
meet the needs of the public and the network.  
According to Milward and Provan (2001), network evaluations must include three 
levels of analysis: community, network, and organization/participant levels. The network can 
achieve effectiveness by minimally satisfying the needs of each group—principals, agents, and 
clients—instead of focusing only on one particular level of analysis. Principals monitor and 
fund the network; agents work as network administrators and service-level professionals; and 
clients receive the products or services from the network. The effectiveness of one level, 
however, does not ensure the effectiveness of the other two. As illustrated in Figure 9, the goals 
between network-level with community-level and organization-level, as shown by the two-way 
arrow between the organization level and the network level depict a reciprocal relationship, as 
does the two-way arrow between the network level and the community level. However, the 
interrelationship between the community-level and organization-level, as depicted by the one-
way arrow between the organization and community level suggests that particular relationship 




Figure 9.  Relationship between effectiveness at different levels of network analysis and 
influence by key stakeholders (Milward & Provan, 2001). 
In addition, the criteria needed to measure network effectiveness vary across the levels. 
At the community level, the criteria are the aggregate outcomes for the population of clients 
being served by the network and the overall costs of service for the client within the network 
community. At the network level, the criteria are the growth of network membership, range of 
services provided, absence of service duplication, relationship strength, creation and 
sustainability of the NAO, integration of services, cost of network maintenance, and the 
member’s commitment to network goals. The criteria for the last level, the organization level, 
are agency survival, enhanced legitimacy, resource acquisition, cost of services, service access, 
client outcomes, and minimum conflict among multi-program agencies across the network.  
C. INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORK INTERACTIONS  
Organizations have numerous ways to interact with other organizations. Their level of 
involvement depends on their purposes and how they view the constraints and opportunities in 
their environments.  
1. Coordination, Cooperation, Collaboration, and Integration 
Kloth and Applegate (2004) identify four ways organizations can interact in their 
Working Together Continuum (Figure 10). The continuum begins with independent 
organizations at the top right and moves clockwise to continuum, coordination, cooperation, 
and collaboration, and ultimately to integration. 
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Figure 10.  Working Together Continuum (Kloth and Applegate, 2004, p. 2). 
Independent. Independent organizations pursue their self-interests without concern for 
or connections with other organizations even though they are in the same sector.  
Coordination. When organizations find value in working with other organizations, they 
identify specific ways they can interact while maintaining and protecting their interests and 
boundaries. An example of coordination is the inter-service coordination between the federal 
and state government in a distinct case. They may have a joint operation, but the boundaries 
remain clear.  
Cooperation. When organizations find value in working with other organizations, they 
share information and technical capabilities. Cooperation can be illustrated by a military joint 
exercise in which the participants implement information sharing and provide technical 
capabilities among them.    
Collaboration. When organizations find value in working with other organizations, 
they pursue a common purpose, share information and financial benefits, and align internal 
policies and practices. An example of collaboration is the relation of the multinational military 
operation in which all of the militaries involved within the collaboration conduct information 
sharing, as well as alignment in policies and practices, in order to attain the mission goals.       
Integration. When organizations find value in working with other organizations, they 
conjoin their purposes, operations, and policies. A fine example of integration is the business 
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merger between two companies that combines all of their assets, operations, and policies for the 
same purpose.  
In a similar vein, Roberts describes a continuum of inter-organizational arrangements. 
Coordination is positioned at the lowest level because the participants have a low degree of 
involvement with other network members (N. Roberts, personal communication, November 
10, 2014). Cooperation, in the mid-range of the continuum, requires a higher degree of 
organizational involvement and interaction, although some resources remain exclusively at the 
disposal of the respective organizations. The next level of inter-organizational arrangements is 
collaboration, in which participants begin to share their resources and operational patterns.  
Kloth and Applegate note that it is possible for organizations to return to former 
arrangements, so the continuum should not be interpreted to mean that one form of interaction 
is inherently better than the others. Selection depends on what is the best fit with the 
environment and the organizations’ purposes. In the case of the Indonesian maritime domain, it 
would appear that the IMSCB is attempting to introduce coordination mechanisms to govern 
the domain, although as described in Chapter I, it faces a number of challenges to move the 
organizations from independence to coordination.     
D. CASES OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS 
How have other organizations dealt with challenges in their respective inter-
organizational domains? We turn to cases in three domains—peace operations, health service 
networks, and other maritime domain networks—to identify ideas for improving inter-
organizational coordination.   
1. Inter-organizational (States) Networks in Peace Operations  
Inter-organization coordination has become one of the most important factors in peace 
operations within the United Nations. Indeed some experts see coordination as a key factor that 
determines operational success (Nitsova, 2012, p. 10). However, challenges in this domain are 
great. Different views about organizational missions, end results, and operations make 
coordination difficult (Paris, 2009, p. 53). One study of inter-organizational coordination in 
hostile environments recommends a centralized governance network (Nitsova, 2012, p. 48). 
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Obstructions to coordination are typically found in national authorities, so strong authority in 
the inter-organizational network is advised.  
Balas (2011) examines the motivation for joining inter-organizational networks. 
Resource-based motivation occurs when international organizations (IOs) need others’ 
resources to support their operations. Complementarity-based motivation occurs when each IO 
pursues its comparative advantages (e.g. conflict resolution skills), and joins with other 
organizations to complement its skill sets. The complexity-based motivation occurs when IOs 
recognize that they lack the knowledge, skills, and competencies in complex peace operations 
so they seek partners to learn from their experiences.    
These cases suggest that giving attention to the inter-organizational network structure 
and governance, as well as to reward systems, might be worth considering in improving 
coordination in Indonesia’s maritime domain.   
2. Inter-organizational Health and Public Services Networks  
Provan and Milward (1995) conducted a comparative study of effectiveness in U.S. 
inter-organizational mental health networks. Their multi-constituency participants included 
clients, families, service professionals, state-level policy makers, funders, agency staff, 
administrators, and taxpayers among the most prominent ones (Provan & Milward, 1995, p. 9). 
They found more effective networks focused on client outcomes, operated in states that 
provided incentives and monitoring mechanisms, and were run locally within a larger system 
that was centrally coordinated through a single core agency (Provan & Milward, 1995, p. 31). 
Despite this, integration among provider organizations did not automatically ensure the 
effectiveness of the overall system. The outcomes were realized only by those networks that 
had centralized network integration, direct, non-fragmented external controls, stability, and 
sufficient resources (p. 28).   
Gibbons’ (2007) research demonstrates the link between the inter-organizational 
network structure and the network’s ability to diffuse information system wide in a health 
system. The results of her research confirm that certain network structures support information 
diffusion, knowledge sharing, collaboration, and access to resources. Gibbons came up with 
five network structures that consist of unconstrained network, fully connected, chain structure, 
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hierarchy, and connected clusters. From those structures, unconstrained networks 
(unconstrained and fully connected) always outperformed the more constrained structures in 
information diffusion. Among the three constrained structures, the chain structure is the worst 
for diffusing information while the other two structures hold merely the same scores for 
information diffusion. The links building that connects sub-groups within the poorly 
performing networks, however, can facilitate the information dissemination throughout the 
network without increasing the network density. Her research recommends small interventions 
by creating additional connections among members in the network structure in order to increase 
its effectivity in diffusing information to the whole system. 
These cases point out the importance of a centralized network system with the 
inclusion of incentives to improve network effectiveness. Furthermore, these examples suggest 
creating small numbers of additional connections can actually increase the capability of 
information diffusion within the network structure. The results from these cases could become 
useful inputs in creating alternative structures in the Indonesian maritime network. Moreover, 
the five structures’ impact on the information diffusion could be taken as models in finding the 
most suitable structure for the Indonesian maritime environment.     
3. Inter-organizational Networks in the Maritime Domain  
Idrobo (1997) searched for alternative designs for Colombia’s inter-organizational 
networks in the maritime domain. Colombia had many competing organizations without an 
overarching authority, similar to Indonesia. Indeed, Colombian authorities hesitated in 
accepting a newly formed Coast Guard as their lead agency. Idrobo concluded that a single 
organization with ultimate authority would be required to ensure coordination of the 
Colombian maritime domain. This is also the case with Indonesian maritime domain. The 
similarity of the challenges and the problem could be the exemplary case for the improvement 
of Indonesian maritime network.   
The Australian government formed the Border Protection Command (BPC) in 2006 as 
a joint agency between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Immigration and Border 
Protection due to increasing multi-dimensional threats. The BPC has primary responsibility and 
operational control over assets of both Australian Defense Forces and Customs and Border 
Protection (Border Protection Command, 2014). Moreover, the BPC has several maritime 
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agency partners who coordinate their tasks especially in border areas. The success of BPC’s 
inter-organizational network suggests how Indonesia’s inter-organization network might be 
configured to improve its coordination. The network structure that involves many inter-
departmental maritime agencies could be a subject of study to improve the Indonesian maritime 
network.    
Similar to the BPC, the Malaysian government established the Malaysian Maritime 
Enforcement Agency (MMEA) in 2006. It found serious problems in Malaysia’s maritime 
enforcement due to numerous agencies with overlapping functions, jurisdictions, and an 
inefficient use of resources (MMEA, 2013). The MMEA’s new mission is to enforce laws at 
sea and to protect the security of Malaysian water territory. It acts as the principal agency for 
the maritime security issues and reports directly to the office of the Malaysian prime minister. 
Under direct order from the prime minister, MMEA subsumed several specific authorities from 
other maritime agencies in the maritime domain. The situation of MMEA formation is similar 
to Indonesia’s IMSCB current condition with several agencies that dwell in the same domain 
with overlapping authorities and jurisdictions. The MMEA’ governance structure also may be 
studied as one alternative for Indonesia’s maritime network.    
Tumin (2007) presented a case study about the importance of information sharing in 
inter-organizational networks in the United States Navy, Coast Guard, and Department of 
Transportation to build maritime domain awareness. The creation of the Maritime Domain 
Awareness (MDA) system played a vital role in maritime security by permitting information 
sharing and dissemination that enhanced situational awareness. Information sharing in the 
Indonesian maritime domain also plays a pivotal role. The creation of an information sharing 
center and improvements in information connectivity among the maritime agencies might be a 
good way to mitigate some of the coordination problems. The implementation of an MDA 
system similar to the one in this case could improve the information sharing system in the 
Indonesian maritime network and could enhance the inter-agencies coordination process.  
Hocevar (2012) describes the formation of the Malacca Sea Patrol (MSP) in 2004, a 
multi-national network combating piracy that consists of several littoral states adjacent to the 
Malacca Strait region, including Indonesia. In addition to MSP, the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), 
initiated by Japan, was established at the strategic level in 2006. Both of these inter-
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organizational and multinational formations utilize an information-sharing center to coordinate 
their operation as well as to disseminate the information among them. These inter-
organizational networks signify the importance of having inter-organizational collaboration to 
improve maritime security in the region by utilizing the information sharing, data collection, 
and analysis technologies. Furthermore, Hocevar (2010) also explains the network innovations 
in port security. The Joint Harbor Operations Center and Maritime Unified Command in San 
Diego area set up integrated operation centers for inter-organizational coordination among 
maritime agencies in San Diego port security. These two centers provided resources and data to 
decrease response time and increase common situational awareness among the participant 
agencies. Utilizing an information-sharing system, the centers were able to increase each 
agency’s awareness of the other’s assets and improve the efficiency of operational 
deployments.  
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter summarizes numerous studies that describe networks and their basic 
features which enable them to coordinate activities in a common environment. Several of the 
methods reviewed in this chapter are used to analyze the Indonesian maritime domain in 
Chapter III.  
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Our search for ways to improve Indonesian maritime domain network coordination 
begins with data collection and data structuring. Our data primarily come from the IMSCB, in 
particular events that involve resource allocations and the incidents occurring within the 
maritime domain. Once we explain how our data are collected and structured, we briefly 
describe our analysis using four different methodologies:  link analysis; geospatial analysis; 
temporal analysis; and social network analysis. The goal of our analysis is to find a better 
structure for the maritime network. Ideally, the new structure will ensure better communication 
and information exchange among the agencies and more efficient operational deployments for 
limited stakeholder resources. 
A. DATA COLLECTION AND STRUCTURING 
We were unable to collect data from all the Indonesian maritime stakeholders due to 
limited data availability and resources. Instead, we drew data from 6 maritime agencies that 
have field resources and conduct operations at sea under the coordination of IMSCB. The data 
for these six agencies primarily came from open sources on the Internet accessed through their 
official websites. The six maritime agencies are: the IMSCB;1 the Navy;2 the maritime police;3 
the fisheries department/PSDKP;4 the coastal unit/KPLP;5 and the customs.6  
From the six official websites, we identified 413 organizations that interact within the 
Indonesian maritime domain. These organizations, henceforth known as nodes, represent the all 
organizations that participate in field operations under the coordination of IMSCB, Taken as a 
whole, they create the formal authority network of the Indonesian maritime domain.  








B. LIMITATIONS OF DATA  
In addition to the limitations noted above, this study uses the data taken from the 
IMSCB data source on the Indonesian maritime domain. The data taken from IMSCB and 
other open sources are not fully reliable since they are collected without going through distinct 
processes to ensure the data reliability. Without proper handling, the data collected will affect 
the presentation in this study. Considering these limitations of analysis, the results of this study 
should be considered tentative and exploratory rather than definitive. Our methodological 
approach (see below) could be the basis for future study when data collection and processing 
have been improved.  . 
C. LINK ANALYSIS 
We began our study using software Palantir to conduct link analysis among the 413 
nodes. Our analysis reveals how the nodes are interconnected with one another in the formal 
authority network. Link analysis is a method to evaluate the process of building up networks of 
interconnected objects in order to explore pattern and trends (Berry & Linoff, 2004, pp. 321‒
322). Link analysis is often confused with social network analysis because both examine the 
pattern of relations among various objects. However, there is one basic difference between 
these two methods. SNA includes only similar types of objects while link analysis examines 
relations between different object types (Everton, 2012, p. 6).  
D. HOTSPOT AND GEOSPATIAL ANALYSIS 
Hotspot spatial analysis, a subset of geospatial analysis, enables us to detect the patterns 
of occurrence of maritime incidents within certain vulnerable areas and to identify areas that 
need more attention due to illicit activities such as robbery at sea, illegal logging, smuggling, 
drug trafficking, and many more criminal activities.  
Geospatial analysis provides a specific perspective on a distinct location in viewing 
events, patterns, and processes that operate on or near the surface of the earth (Smith et al. 
2012). The mapping of maritime incidents in Indonesia uses geospatial analysis to determine 
the gravity of the maritime issues. These incidents then can be grouped into clusters to identify 
the types of the incident that take place in certain geographical locations. Ultimately, Smith 
explains the focus of geospatial analysis on the occurrences’ locations and their linkage to the 
geographic information. In order to analyze the geospatial aspect, ArcGIS software is employed 
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to map the occurrences and relate them to specific attributes in order to predict plausible actions 
(Eris, 2014). ArcGIS is utilized to process the data, so they can be used to find the hotspots and 
outliers and natural clusters of data in finding the best way to employ resources. 
We also employ hotspot visualization to anticipate the proper deployment of necessary 
resources to those areas most in need. Using data from the maritime network resources 
mapping (see below) and the hotspot mapping, a network’s overall mapping picture illustrates 
the location of the network’s resources and the incidents that take place in a single operational 
visualization. This operational picture then is able to identify the network facility closest to the 
hotspot. The analysis can also calculate the feasible distance from the resources location to the 
target area in order to find out whether the distances are within the reach of the network’s 
assets. Thus, our integrated geospatial mapping method enables us to locate resources across 
the domain and to suggest ways to distribute those resources based on the closest facility in 
order to reduce transaction costs.   
E. TEMPORAL ANALYSIS 
Within the Indonesian maritime domain network, temporal analysis reveals 
information about the time patterns of incident occurrences in the sea. Most importantly, it also 
enables us to recognize dynamic changes in the pattern of incidents over time (Peuquet, 1994). 
Our temporal analysis utilizes Palantir software which allows us to isolate certain interesting 
patterns such as the spikes or low-points of an activity over time. Palantir, a software 
application for integrating, visualizing, and analyzing information (Palantir, 2004), offers is 
other advantages as well. It enables us to do timeline analysis and create graphic 
representations and event histograms and integrate all types of analyses such as statistic, 
regional, temporal, geospatial, and SNA (see below) into one platform (Payne et al. 2008).  
F. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS  
Social network analysis (SNA) is a methodology used to analyze the structure of 
networks with quantitative measures (Everton, 2012, p.5). Moreover, SNA determines the 
interaction and ties among actors within the networks in which they are embedded (Everton, 
2012).  
This study begins with an examination of the formal authority network structure under 
IMSCB’s coordination. It then explores two additional network structures—the regionally-
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clustered network and sea-lane clustered network—as alternatives to improve network 
coordination.  
As mentioned in the data collection above, each structure of these networks within the 
Indonesian maritime network consists of six maritime agencies with 413 nodes that comprise a 
series of matrices. The matrix construction is then used for processing the data using the ORA 
software program. ORA software has many features. It is an analysis tool to examine network 
change over time and space with a variety of geo-spatial network metrics and change detection 
techniques. It also can identify model network changes over time and perform Course of 
Action analysis. ORA software also is used to describe a network’s topography and centrality 
and detect risks or vulnerabilities of network design structure. Moreover, it can assist the 
analyst in evaluating one or more networks by assessing the nature of, features of, change in, 
and determinants of complex networks (Carley et al. 2013).  
Our SNA analysis focuses on six parameters to assess the network’s formal structure. 
Those parameters are diameter, average distance, density, betweenness centrality, betweenness 
centralization, and closeness centrality. Network diameter refers to “a network’s longest 
geodesic line and could indicate how dispersed the network is. Everton explains that a network 
with large diameters may be more decentralized than a small one (Everton, 2012, p. 137). 
Moreover, he argues that decentralized networks are suitable for solving non-routine, complex, 
and/or rapidly changing problems or challenges (Everton, 2012, p. 137). According to Everton 
(2012), “Average distance refers to the average length of all the shortest paths between all 
actors in a network.” (p. 137). He argues, “Information should diffuse faster through networks 
with lower average distance than those with higher average distance” (p. 137). Good 
information diffusion within a network may ensure effective and efficient coordination process 
in the formal structure among agencies within a network.  
The next parameter considered is density of the network, which Scott et al. (2005), 
defined as “the number of actual connections between members divided by the number of 
possible connections” (pp. 445‒446). The more connections that occur among the actors within 
a network, the denser the network will become. The density of the network may impact the 
network’s ability to coordinate its activities. The high score of density may ease the 
coordination process among the actors in a network. Betweenness centrality, the most used 
measurement according to Freeman (1979), identifies an actor’s role in a network by measuring 
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its ownership on information and resources control (Corteville, 2009, p. 13). This measure 
computes the extent of each actor’s shortest paths that connect all actors in the network 
(Everton, 2012, p. 210). An organization with a high level of betweenness centrality has control 
of the information flow and resources in a network. Moreover, this organization has the 
capability for maintaining the network communication (Shimbel, 1953) and also for 
coordinating group processes (Cohn & Marriott, 1958). Therefore, an organization with high 
scores of betweenness centrality would coordinate a network better.  
Meanwhile, betweenness centralization is a variation of the actor’s betweenness 
centrality scores within a network. The bigger a network’s centralization index, the more likely 
an actor in a network will have a high betweenness centrality score in comparison with other 
actors. Betweenness centralization measures the extent to which actors located between other 
actors in the network. Closeness centrality calculates the average geodesic distance of an actor 
to all actors within a network (Everton, 2012, p. 209). For example, a score of 1.00 indicates 
that an actor is one step away from other actors in the network. Meanwhile, a score that is close 
to 0.00 designates the maximum distance of an actor within a network. Hakimi (1965) and 
Sabidussi (1966) argue that a central actor of a network would communicate with other points 
with minimum time and cost, and the actor would have advantages in making coordination 
around the network structures. 
Applying these measures to network structures will generate more effective 
coordination processes of the formal structure among the maritime agencies in the domain. 
Moreover, an effective structure would distribute information faster for the network. This 
effectiveness is crucial for ensuring an equal level of coordination process, timely information 
distribution and proper understanding of the maritime issues.  
G. SUMMARY 
This study provides an overview of the four methodologies (link analysis, hot-spot and 
geospatial analysis, temporal analysis, and social network analysis) that are used to describe 
and explore the IMSCB’s current formal inter-organizational network structure. The results of 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This chapter employs four methodologies (link analysis, geospatial analysis, temporal 
analysis, and social network analysis) to analyze the event and incident data drawn from the 
Indonesian maritime domain.   The objective of this chapter is to describe the domain’s 
activities and operations and the formal network structure that coordinates it.  
A. LINK ANALYSIS 
Link analysis helps to visualize the connections between maritime agencies authorities 
in regard to the incidents in the Indonesian water territory. Accidents at sea are under the 
authority of all agencies. Meanwhile, violations of the law are processed according to the 
mandates of the respective agency, based on the government regulation. IMSCB has the 
authority to address all incidents at sea since it involves all stakeholders under its authority for 
maritime operations. The Navy is authorized for most of the incidents except for asylum 
seekers and illegal logging. Similarly, the Marine Police Force is authorized for most incidents 
with the exception of illegal fishing. Coastal units are only authorized to investigate ships’ sea-
worthiness documents, while customs has the mandate to oversee the flow of goods coming in 
or out of the country. The last agency is the Fisheries Department that has the mandate to 
investigate illegal fishing. These organizations and their authorities are illustrated in the Figure 





Figure 11.  Link chart of the Indonesian Maritime Agencies with their authorities. 
As shown in Figure 11, the IMSCB coordinates the other maritime agencies in the 
network and oversees its authorities to ensure unity of effort.  
We turn to the geospatial analysis below to identify the hotspots where incidents and 
crimes are committed at sea. A key question is whether agencies are located close to the 
hotspots where incidents are occurring.  
B. GEOSPATIAL ANALYSIS 
The geospatial analysis method can pinpoint the hotspots where incidents and crimes 
are committed at sea. Overlaying the agencies on the hotspot map then enables the analyst to 
identify which agencies are co-located in the regions where the incidents occur.     
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1. Accidents at Sea 
The accidents-at-sea data used in this analysis were gathered from the IMSCB database 
from 2008 to 2013. The region with the highest accident density is concentrated in the Riau 
Islands, Batam water area, the Gulf of Jakarta, and Sunda Strait. Meanwhile, a moderate 
number of accidents takes place in the harbor area in Belawan Harbor, the Gulf of Bayur, 
Banjarmasin water area, Bangka-Belitung water area, Makassar water area, and Kupang water 
Area (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12.  Accident-at-sea hotspots from 2008 to 2013.  
2. Violations at Sea 
The data for the violations at sea ranges from 2011 to September 2013. The various 
data then were sorted into ten categories: armed robbery, asylum seeker, boundary violation, 
environment pollution, human trafficking, illegal fishing, inadequate document, smuggling, and 
illicit sea treasure exploration. 
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a. Armed Robbery 
The Batam water at the end of Malacca Strait is the hottest spot for armed robbery. The 
next places are the Dumai water area, Belawan water area, Malacca Strait, and Balikpapan 
water area (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13.  Armed robbery hotspots with authorized maritime agencies mapping. 
The next step is to identify whether the agencies with the required authorities to 
investigate and process armed robbery are adjacent to the hotspot area. Table 1 presents the 
maritime law enforcement agencies that are located in the vicinity of the hotspot areas. The 
analysis shows that the numbers of agencies are sufficient to cover the hotspot areas. 
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Table 1.   List of maritime agencies in the armed robbery hotspots. 
Hot Spot Field Office 
Belawan water and Malacca 
Strait 
Main Naval Base I Belawan 
Naval Post Pangkalan Susu 
Naval Post Seruway 
Regional Marine Police North Sumatra 
Dumai water 
Naval Base Dumai  
Naval Post Tanjung Medang 
Batam water and Riau Islands 
Task Force I Batam  
MRCC Batam  
RCC Tg Balai Karimun  
Main Naval Base IV Tg. Pinang  
Naval Post Lagoi 
Naval Post Berakit  
Naval Base Batam  
Naval Post Tanjung Sangkuang 
Naval Post Tolop 
Naval Post Sambu 
Naval Post Nipa Island 
Naval Post Abang Island 
Naval Post Sugi 
Naval Post Galang Island 
Naval Post Telaga Punggur 
Naval Post Tanjung Datuk 
Naval Post Tanjung. Balai Karimun 
Naval Post Takong Hiu 
Naval Post Leho 
Naval Post Moro 
Naval Post Mentigi 
Naval Air Base Tanjung Pinang 
Regional Marine Police Riau Islands 
Balikpapan water 
Naval Base Balikpapan 
Naval Post Kampung Baru 
Regional Marine Police East Borneo 
 
b. Asylum Seeker 
Asylum-seeking is a form of boundary violation that requires careful handling. The 
Indonesian waters normally are used as a transit for asylum seekers before reaching their final 
destination, primarily Australia. The hotspot areas for this type of violation are in the Gulf of 
Jakarta, Banten water area, Sunda Strait, Garut water area, Cilacap water, Wonogiri water, 
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Surabaya water, Madura water, and Kupang water area (Figure 14). The regions of Jakarta, 
Banten, Sunda Strait, and Garut are the highest hotspots for the asylum seeker category.  
The agencies that have the authorities to address the asylum-seeker category are listed 
in Table 2. Although some of the agencies do not have the authority to process the asylum 
seekers, they can conduct the initial investigation prior to further processing by the authorized 
agencies.  
Table 2.   List of maritime agencies in the asylum-seeker hotspots. 
Hot Spot Field Office 
Banten water Regional Marine Police Banten 
Kupang water 
Regional Marine Police Nusa Tenggara 
Timur RCC Kupang 
Surabaya and Madura 
waters 
Regional Marine Police East Java 
Gulf of Jakarta  
Regional Marine Police Metro Jaya, 
IMSCB HQ 
Sunda Strait Regional Marine Police Lampung 
 
Figure 14.  Asylum-seeker hotspots with authorized maritime agencies mapping. 
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c. Boundary Violation 
Boundary violations are committed by foreign ships that do not have a legal basis to 
enter the Indonesian water, and their activities in the area present security violations as well as 
territorial breaches. The hotspot areas for this type of violation are to be found in Belawan 
Water and the Malacca Strait, Nias Island water, Juwana water, Pacitan water, Eastern Madura 
water, Northeastern Bali water, Berau water, Halmahera water, and Arafuru water areas (Figure 
15).  
Different from other hotspot areas, the hotspot areas in Eastern Madura, Northeastern 
Bali, Halmahera, and Arafuru waters do not have available maritime agencies in the vicinity. 
The closest agency to the Northeastern Bali hotspot is the RCC Karang Asem that is located 32 
nm away; the closest agency to the Eastern Madura hotspot is the Paiton naval post that is 
located 54 nm away; the closest agency to the Halmahera hotspot is the Feni Island naval post 
located 74 nm away; and the closest agency to the Arafuru hotspot is the Wanam naval post as 
far as 106 nm away (Table 3).    
Table 3.   List of maritime agencies in the boundary violation hotspots. 
Hot Spot Field Office 
Belawan water and Malacca 
Strait 
Main Naval Base I Belawan  
Naval Post Tanjung Tiram 
Naval Post Bandar Khalifah  
Regional Marine Police North Sumatera 
Nias Island water  
Naval Post Gunung Sitoli  
Naval Post Teluk Dalam 
Rembang water 
Naval Post Rembang  
Naval Post Jepara 
Pacitan water Naval Post Sadeng 
Eastern Madura water 
Eastern Fleet Command  
Main Naval Base V Surabaya  
Naval Post Logending  
Naval Post Paiton  
Naval Base Batuporon  
Naval Post Sadeng  
Naval Air Base Juanda  
Regional Marine Police East java 
Northeastern Bali water 
Naval Post Celukan Bawang  
Naval Post Gili Air  
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Hot Spot Field Office 
RCC Karang Asem 
Berau water East Borneo 
Naval Post Pulau Derawan  
Naval Post Pulau Maratua  
Naval Post Tanjung Batu 
Halmahera water 
Naval Base Morotai  
Naval Post Gebe Island  
Naval Post Feni Island 
Arafuru water 
Main Naval Base XI Merauke  
Naval Post Wanam  




Figure 15.  Boundary violation hotspots with authorized maritime agencies mapping. 
d. Environmental Pollution 
Environmental pollution includes all activities that affect and degrade the 
environment’s physical functions. Toxic waste-dumping into the sea would be one examples. 
The hotspot areas for such activity are in the Deli Serdang, Dumai, Padang, Batam, Riau 
Islands waters, Northern water of Pangkal Pinang, Northern waters of Banten, Southern Coast 
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of East Java, Bau-bau water, and Jayapura water (Figure 16). Table 4 shows the agencies in the 
vicinity of the hotspot areas.  
Table 4.   List of maritime agencies in the environmental pollution hotspots. 
Hot Spot Field Office 
Deli Serdang water 
Regional Marine Police North 
Sumatra  
Main Naval Base I Belawan  
Naval Post Tanjung Tiram 
Dumai water 
Naval base Dumai  
Naval Post Tanjung Medang 
Batam and Riau Islands 
waters 
Naval Post Selat Panjang  
Main Naval Base IV Tg. Pinang  
Naval Post Lagoi  
Naval Post Berakit  
Naval Base Batam  
Naval Post Tanjung Sangkuang 
Naval Post Tolop  
Naval Post Sambu  
Naval Post Nipa Island  
Naval Post Abang Island  
Naval Post Sugi  
Naval Post Galang Island 
Naval Post Telaga Punggur 
Naval Post Tanjung Datuk 
Naval Base Tanjung Balai Karimun 
Naval Post Takong Hiu 
Naval Post Leho 
Naval Post Moro 
Naval Base Mentigi 
Naval Air Base Tanjung Pinang 
Regional Marine PoliceRiau Islands 
Task Force I Batam 
MRCC Batam 
RCC Tanjung Balai Karimun 
Padang water 
 
Main Naval Base II Padang 
Naval Post Enggano Island 
Naval Post Simaubuk 
Northern waters of 
Pangkal Pinang 
 
Naval Base Bangka Belitung 
Naval Post Pangkal Balam 
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Hot Spot Field Office 
Northern waters of Banten 
 
Naval Base Banten 
Naval Post Kronjo 
Naval Post Pulau Panjang 
Naval Post Pulau Sangiang 
Naval Post Pulau Tempurung 
Regional Marine Police Banten 
Southern Coast of East 
Java 
Naval Post Sendang Biru 
Bau-bau water Naval Post Bau-bau 
Papua water 
 
Main Naval Base X Jayapura 
Naval Post Skow Sae 




Figure 16.  Environmental pollution hotspots with authorized maritime agencies mapping. 
e. Human Trafficking 
Human trafficking is an illicit activity in which a human being is the object of 
commodities by coercion for the purpose of human exploitation. The highest hotspot areas for 
this type of activity are in the Kupang and Surabaya waters. The lower-density hotspots are in 
Batam, Ujung Kulon, Southern Yogyakarta water, and Pare-pare water (Figure 17). Agencies 
in these areas are shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5.   List of maritime agencies in the human trafficking hotspots. 
Hotspot Field Office 
Tanjung Balai Asahan water 
 
Naval Base Tanjung Balai Asahan 
Naval Post Bagan Asahan 
Naval Post Sei Berombang 
Batam water 
 
Task Force I Batam 
MRCC Batam 
Marine Police Riau Islands 
Main Naval Base IV Tg. Pinang 
Naval Post Lagoi 
Naval Post Berakit 
Naval Base Batam 
Naval Post Tanjung Sangkuang 
Naval Post Tolop 
Naval Post Sambu 
Naval Post Pulau Nipa 
Naval Post Telaga Punggur 
Naval Post Takong Hiu 
Naval Base Mentigi 
Ujung Kulon water 
 
Naval Post Binuangen 
Naval Post Sumur 
Southern Yogyakarta water 
  
Naval Base Yogyakarta 
Naval Post Sadeng 
Marine Police Yogyakarta 
Surabaya water 
 
Eastern Fleet HQ 
Naval Base Batuporon 
Main Naval Base V Surabaya 
Naval Air Base Juanda 
Marine Police East Java 
Pare-pare water Naval Post Pinrang 
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Figure 17.  Human trafficking hotspots with authorized maritime agencies mapping.  
f. Illegal Fishing  
Fishing activities in the sea are deemed illegal when they do not abide by the fisheries 
regulations that include license requirements, taxes, and approved locations and times for 
fishing. The hotspots of these illegal activities are spread widely in the archipelago (Figure 18). 
The concentration of such activities is in the Belawan to Tanjung Balai Asahan waters, Western 
Aceh water, Batam and Riau Islands water, Tarempa Island water, Bangka-Belitung water, the 
Gulf of Jakarta water, Northern Banten water, Sunda Strait, Cirebon and Tegal water, 
Makassar, Tarakan Water, Celebes Sea from Manado to Tahuna water, and Southern Ambon 
water. Table 6 shows the agencies in the vicinity of these hotspots.  
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Table 6.   List of maritime agencies in the illegal fishing hotspots. 
Hotspot Field Office 
Belawan-Tanjung Balai Asahan 
waters 
 
Main Naval Base I Belawan 
Naval Post Pangkalan Susu 
Naval Post Seruway 
Naval Base T.B. Asahan 
Naval Post Tanjung Tiram 
Naval Post Sei Berombang 
Naval Post Bagan Asahan 
Naval Post Bandar Khalifah 
Naval Post Pulau Jemur 
Work Unit PSDKP Tanjung Balai Karimun 
Work Unit PSDKP Belawan 
Western Aceh water 
 
Naval Post Lampulo 
Naval Post Lhoknga 
Regional Marine Police Aceh 
RCC Aceh 
Batam and Kepri waters 
 
Main Naval Base IV Tg. Pinang 
Naval Post Lagoi 
Naval Post Berakit 
Naval Base Batam 
Naval Post Tanjung Sangkuang 
Naval Post Tolop 
Naval Post Sambu 
Naval Post Pulau Nipa 
Naval Post Sugi 
Naval Post Pulau Galang 
Naval Post Telaga Punggur 
Naval Post Tanjung Datuk 
Naval Base Tanjung Balai Karimun 
Naval Post Takong Hiu 
Naval Post Leho 
Naval Post Moro 
Naval Base Mentigi 
Naval Air Base Tanjung Pinang 
Work Unit PSDKP Batam 
Work Unit PSDKP Moro 
Work Unit PSDKP Tanjung Pinang 
Work Unit PSDKP Pulau Kijang 
Work Unit PSDKP Moro 
Work Unit PSDKP Tanjung Balai Karimun 
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Hotspot Field Office 
Tarempa water 
 
Naval Base Tarempa 
Naval Air Base Matak  
Naval Post Jemaja 
Naval Post Memperuk 
Naval Post Mengkait 
Naval Post Pulau Mangkai 
Work Unit PSDKP Tarempa 
Natuna water 
 
Naval Base Ranai 
Naval Post Penangi 
Naval Post Pulau Laut 
Naval Post Sebang Mawang 
Naval Post Sedanau 
Work Unit PSDKP Natuna  
RCC Natuna 
Bangka Belitung water 
 
Work Unit PSDKP Sungai Liat 
Work Unit PSDKP Tanjung Pandan 
Naval Post Pangkal Balam 
Naval Post Pulau Mendanau 
Jakarta Gulf, Northern Banten 




Main Naval Base III Jakarta 
Naval Post Pulau Karya 
Naval Post Tanjung Pasir 
Naval Base Banten 
Naval Post Pulau Sangiang 
Naval Post Pulau Tempurung 
Naval Post Pulau Panjang 
Naval Post Sumur 
Naval Post Kronjo 
Naval Base Lampung 
Naval Post Kota Agung 
Naval Post Labuan Maringgai 
Naval Air Base Jakarta 
Base PSDKP Jakarta 
Work Unit PSDKP Muara Angke 
Work Unit PSDKP Lempasing 
Work Unit PSDKP Karangantu 
IMSCB HQ 
 45 
Hotspot Field Office 
Cirebon and Tegal waters 
 
Naval Base Cirebon 
Naval Base Tegal  
Naval Post Gebang 
Naval Post Kluwut 
Naval Post Sigandu 
Naval Post Tanjung Sari 
Work Unit PSDKP Batang 
Work Unit PSDKP Kejawan 
Work Unit PSDKP Pekalongan 
Work Unit PSDKP Tegalsari 
Makassar water 
 
Main Naval Base VI Makassar 
Work Unit PSDKP Makassar 
Tarakan water 
 
Naval Base Tarakan 
Naval Post Bunyu 
Naval Post Pantai Amal 
Naval Post Tanjung Ahus 
Work Unit PSDKP Tarakan 
RCC Tarakan 




Task Force II Manado  
Main Naval Base VIII Manado 
Naval Base Tahuna 
Naval Air Base Manado 
Work Unit PSDKP Dagho 
Work Unit PSDKP Bitung 
Southern Ambon waters 
 
MRCC Ambon 
Task Force III Ambon 
Work Unit Ambon  




Figure 18.  Illegal Fishing hotspots with authorized maritime agencies mapping. 
g. Illegal Logging 
Illegal logging is the violation of laws that regulate the harvest, use, transport, and the 
sale of timber as products from the forest. These activities are conducted without legitimate 
rights of timber management. The hotspots of this illicit activity are concentrated in the 
Tanjung Balai Asahan water, Dumai and Bengkalis waters, Batam and Riau Islands water, 
Indragiri Hilir water, Kapuas River, Natuna Islands water, the Gulf of Sibolga, Tarakan and 
Nunukan waters, Balikpapan water, and Makassar Strait and water (Figure 19). The agencies in 









Table 7.   List of maritime agencies in illegal logging hotspots. 
 
As reflected in Table 7, some hotspots do not have agencies with the authorities to deal 
with illegal logging, such as Tanjung Balai Asahan water, Indragiri Hilir water, and the Gulf of 
Sibolga.  
 
Figure 19.   Illegal logging hotspots with authorized maritime agencies mapping. 
h. Inadequate Documents  
The laws of navigation oblige the ships that sail in Indonesian territorial water to have 
complete documents that confirm their seaworthiness. Neglect in completing these documents 
results in violation of the law. This type of violation is concentrated in Dumai and Bengkalis 
Hotspot Field Office 
Dumai and Bengkalis waters Marine Police Riau 




Task Force I Batam 
Marine Police Riau Islands 
Natuna water RCC Natuna 
Kapuas River Marine Police West Kalimantan 
Balikpapan water and Makassar 
strait Marine Police East Kalimantan 
Makassar water Marine Police South Sulawesi 
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waters, Batam and Riau Islands water, Natuna water, Jambi water, Northern Central Java 
water, Sangihe Islands water, Kolaka water, Northern Ambon water, and Sorong water (Figure 
20). The agencies located in or near these hotspots are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8.   List of maritime agencies in the inadequate document hotspots. 
Hotspot Field Office 
Dumai and Bengkalis 
waters 
Naval base Dumai 
Naval Post Bengkalis 
Naval Post Muntai  
Naval Post Tanjung Medang 
Marine Police Sumbar 
Batam and Kepri waters 
 
Main Naval Base IV Tg. Pinang 
Naval Post Lagoi 
Naval Post Berakit 
Naval base Batam 
Naval Post Tanjung Sangkuang 
Naval Post Tolop 
Naval Post Sambu 
Naval Post Pulau Nipa 
Naval Post Pulau Abang 
Naval Post Sugi 
Naval Post Pulau Galang 
Naval Post Telaga Punggur 
Naval Post Tanjung Datuk 
Naval base Tanjung Balai Karimun 
Naval Post Takong Hiu 
Naval Post Leho 
Naval Post Moro 
Naval base Mentigi 
Naval Air Base Tanjung Pinang 
MRCC Batam 
RCC TBK 
Task Force I Batam 
Marine Police Kepri 
Jambi water 
Marine Police Jambi 
Naval Post Jambi 
Northern Centre Java water 
 
Naval base Semarang 
Naval Post Jepara 
Naval Post Sigandu 
Naval Post Tanjung Sari 
Marine Police Central Java 
Sangihe Island water Naval base Tahuna 
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Hotspot Field Office 
Manado water 
 
Main Naval Base VIII Manado 
Naval Air Base Manado 
Naval Post Arakan 
Naval Post Atep Oki 
MRCC Manado 
RCC Kema 
Task Force II Manado 
Marine Police Sulut 
Kolaka water Naval Post Kolaka 
Northern Ambon water 
 
Main Naval Base IX Ambon 
Naval Post Bula 
Naval Post Pulau Buru 
MRCC Ambon 
Task Force III Ambon 
Marine Police Maluku 
Sorong water 
 
Naval base Sorong 




Figure 20.  Inadequate documents hotspots with authorized maritime agencies mapping. 
i. Smuggling 
Smuggling includes all unlawful transportation of goods and commodities, sometimes 
dangerous and illegal commodities such as weapon and drugs, coming in or out of countries 
without any legitimate documentation. Smuggling is concentrated in Medan water, Tanjung 
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Balai Asahan water, Dumai water, Batam and Riau Islands waters, Jakarta and Tangerang 
waters, Surabaya water, Balikpapan to Smarinda waters, and Manado water (Figure 21). The 
agencies in these areas are shown in Table 9. 
Table 9.   List of maritime agencies in the smuggling hotspots. 
Hotspot Field Office 
Medan water 
Marine Police North Sumatra 
Main Naval Base I Belawan 
Tanjung Balai Asahan water 
 
Naval Base Tanjung Balai Asahan 
Naval Post Bagan Asahan 
Naval Post Sei Berombang 
Naval Post Tanjung Tiram 
Dumai water 
 
Naval Base Dumai 
Naval Post Bengkalis 
Naval Post Tanjung Medang 
Naval Post Muntai 
Batam and Kepri waters 
Main Naval Base IV Tg. Pinang 
Naval Post Lagoi 
Naval Post Berakit 
Naval base Batam 
Naval Post Tanjung Sangkuang 
Naval Post Tolop 
Naval Post Sambu 
Naval Post Pulau Nipa 
Naval Post Pulau Abang 
Naval Post Sugi 
Naval Post Pulau Galang 
Naval Post Telaga Punggur 
Naval Post Tanjung Datuk 
Naval Base Tanjung Balai Karimun 
Naval Post Takong Hiu 
Naval Post Leho 
Naval Post Moro 
Naval Base Mentigi 
Naval Air Base Tanjung Pinang 
MRCC Batam 
RCC TBK 
Task Force I Batam 
Marine Police Riau Islands 
Operational Base Batam 
Operational Base Tanjung Balai Karimun 
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Hotspot Field Office 
Jakarta and Tangerang 
waters 
 
Western Fleet HQ 
Main Naval Base III Jakarta 
Naval Post Kronjo 
Naval Post Pulau Karya 
Naval Post Pulau Panjang 
Naval Post Tanjung Pasir 
Marine Police Banten 
Marine Police Metro Jaya 




Eastern Fleet HQ 
Naval base Batuporon 
Main Naval Base V Surabaya 
Naval Air Base Juanda 
Regional Marine Police East Java 
Balikpapan and Samarinda 
waters 
 
Naval Base Balikpapan 
Naval Post Anggana 
Naval Post Kampung Baru 
Marine Police East Borneo 
Manado water 
 
Main Naval Base VIII Manado 
Naval Air Base Manado 
Naval Post Arakan 
Naval Post Atep Oki 
MRCC Manado 
RCC Kema 
Task Force II Manado 
Marine Police North Sulawesi 
 52 
 
Figure 21.  Smuggling hotspots with authorized maritime agencies mapping. 
j. Illicit Sea Treasure Exploration  
This activity entails unlawful seabed exploration without legitimate documentation in 
order to salvage sunken ships that may contain valuable goods. The hotspots are in Tanjung 
Pinang water and Konawe water (Figure 22). Table 10 shows the authorized agencies in the 
areas adjacent to the hotspots for illegal sea exploration.  
Table 10.     The list of the agencies in the illicit sea treasure exploration hotspots. 
Hotspot Field Office 
Southern Bintan Island water 
 
Main Naval Base IV Tg. Pinang 
Lanal Mentigi 
Naval Air Base Tg. Pinang 
Naval Post Berakit 
Naval Post Galang Island 
Konawe water Naval Post North Konawe  
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Figure 22.  Illicit sea treasure exploration with authorized maritime agencies mapping. 
C. TEMPORAL ANALYSIS 
Temporal analysis examines the trend of incidents and crimes at sea with time as the 
basis of analysis. This study analyzes the incidents based on two categories. They are month of 
the year and day of the week. The distribution of incidents at sea is then analyzed using this 
method by measuring the percentage of the incidents that take place during each month in a 
year. Similarly, the same treatment is applied to the distribution of incidents on a day-of-the-
week basis. This method enables the analysis of incident distribution over the entire year month 
by month and then compares the level of activities for each day of the week. 
Similar to spatial analysis, the temporal analysis method includes two types of incidents 
at sea: accidents at sea and violations at sea.  
1. Accidents at Sea 
The accidents data included in this study are taken from IMSCB’s data source ranging 
from the year 2008 to 2013. There is no conspicuous pattern in the month-of-the-year accidents 
distribution. However, January is the month with the highest percentage of accidents, followed 
by July, August, and September (Figure 23). The assumption is that January is the first month 
of the year and there are more ships steaming en route in comparison with other months and, 
therefore, increasing the possibilities of accidents at sea. 
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Figure 23.  Percentages of accidents on each month of the year from 2008 to 2013 (based 
on 1,892 accidents; percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding). 
From the day-of-the-week distribution (Figure 24), the concentration of accidents 
appears to take place Tuesday through Saturday, with the percentage well above 13% as 
compared to slightly below 13% on Sundays and Mondays. This might be caused by fewer 
activities on Sunday and Monday.   
 
 
Figure 24.  Percentages of accidents on each day of the week from 2008 to 2013 (based on 
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2. Violations at Sea 
The data taken from IMSCB’s data source ranging from January 2011 to September 
2013 are categorized into ten types of violations. The data used for month-of-the-year category 
are from January 2011 to December 2013. Meanwhile, the day-of-the-week category includes 
all data from January 2011 to September 2014 to add greater accuracy to the analysis. 
However, one of the difficulties in the analysis is the insufficient amount of data. Some of the 
violation types have insufficient data for the purposes of analysis. Among these types are 
boundary violations, human trafficking, and illicit sea treasure exploration (Table 11). The 
minimum data requirement for analysis is five cases in each time variable for each type of 
violation (Larseen & Marx, 1981). Therefore, minimum requirements of 35 violations are 
required to analyze the distribution of the day-of-the-week category, and at least 60 violations 
are required to analyze the month-of-the-year category. Due to insufficient data, four types of 
violations cannot be analyzed: boundary violations, environmental pollution, human 
trafficking, and illicit sea treasure exploration.  
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Table 11.   Number of incidents for each violation type in two categories. 
Type of violation Number of Incidents 
 Month-of-year Day-of-week 
Armed Robbery 97 119 
Asylum Seeker 66 70 
Boundary Violation 10 13 
Environment Pollution 18 29 
Human Trafficking 10 14 
Illegal Fishing 348 388 
Illegal Logging 60 70 
Inadequate Document 142 164 
Smuggling 268 348 
Illicit Sea Treasure Exploration 4 5 
 
a. Armed Robbery  
There is no distinct pattern for month-of the-year distribution. For certain months 
(January, May, August, September, and October) the number for this type of violation is 
relatively low (Figure 25). In August through October the number of armed robberies is 
relatively small.  
 
Figure 25.  Armed robbery month-of-year distribution. 
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Similar to the previous analysis, day-of-week distribution yields a uniform pattern over 
the entire week. However, it seems that incidents are less likely to occur on Sunday (Figure 26). 
 
Figure 26.  Armed robbery day-of-week distribution. 
b. Asylum Seeker 
This type of violation occurs almost uniformly the entire year except at the beginning 
and end of the year (Figure 27).  
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The day-of-week distribution is somewhat less uniform than that for month of the year. 
More than 80% of incidents occurred on week days, and only 17.1% occurred on Saturday and 
Sunday (Figure 28).  
 
Figure 28.  Asylum seeker day-of-the-week distribution. 
c. Illegal Fishing  
The month-of-year distribution for illegal fishing shows a clearer pattern. Although 
incidents occur throughout the year, there are times when there is significantly more activity 
than at other times. Ratcliffe (2004) labels this type of crime hotspot as “focused.” The number 
of violations rises significantly in March, April, and May, with the total percentage in these 
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Figure 29.  Illegal fishing month-of-the-year distribution. 
In contrast with the month-of-the-year distribution, the day-of-the-week category does 
not reveal a clear pattern. The only assumption that can be gleaned is that incidents are least 
likely to take place on Sunday and Monday (Figure 30).  
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d. Illegal Logging  
The monthly pattern of illegal logging is less clear than those for illegal fishing. 
However, there are still some patterns that seem focused. Illegal logging activities are 
concentrated during March through April and also from October to November in comparison 
with the other months (Figure 31).  
 
Figure 31.  Illegal logging month-of-the-year distribution. 
There is no obvious pattern in the day-of-the-week distribution. However, it is worth 
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Figure 32.  Illegal logging day-of-the-week distribution.  
e. Inadequate Documents  
There are no distinct patterns in the month-of-the-year distribution for inadequate 
documents. The number of violations is conspicuously high, however, in February, August, and 
November. The total percentage of 42.3 % is only for these three months (Figure 33). These 
activities are least likely to take place in January and December.  
 




















Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
 62 
Day-of-the-week distribution shows acute types of temporal hotspot categories 
(Ratcliffe, 2004, p. 12). In this case, 38.4% of the activities fall on one day only, which is on 
Thursday. Although incidents occur throughout the week, there are many fewer incidents 
happening outside the acute time (Figure 34).  
 
Figure 34.  Inadequate document day-of-the-week distribution.  
f. Smuggling 
Smuggling activities that take place throughout the year do not have a clear pattern. 
Even so, a significant rise in activities can be spotted in May and September (Figure 35).  
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The day-of-the-week pattern is less uniform in comparison to the month-of-the-year 
distribution. Smuggling activities mostly take place on the weekdays from Monday through 
Friday and drop significantly on the weekend (Figure 36).   
 
Figure 36.  Smuggling day-of-the-week distribution. 
D. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
Using SNA, this study describes the current network structure. It begins by providing 
an overview of the network’s topology in terms of its density, diameter, and average distance 
metrics. Centralization analysis also is employed to ascertain how centralized the network is.    
Finally, we run centrality analysis, using degree, betweenness and closeness centrality metrics 
to determine which organization/agency holds the central role within a network.  
The current Indonesian maritime network shown below is the formal authority network 
structure. It is structured as a hierarchy, where every level reports to the one above it. The 
highest level is the Headquarters or the Directorate General. IMSCB as the coordinator collects 
all of the information from the HQ of each of the maritime agencies. The information is then 
distributed equally among the stakeholders of the maritime network. The structure of the 












Figure 37.  Indonesian formal authority network structure. 
1. Basic Topographical Metrics 
SNA analysis examines 413 nodes of the maritime security agencies from six 
Indonesian maritime network stakeholders. These stakeholders hold authorities to conduct 
maritime security operations on the sea. The nodes in the picture represent the IMSCB, Navy, 
Marine Police, KPLP, PSDKP, and customs agencies. 
The basic topographical metrics of the formal authority network are shown in Table 12. 
The network has a density of 0.007 which means it has relatively few ties among the agencies 
in the network. The only connections are those in the hierarchy. (High density scores would be 
indicative of another type of structure which enables transfer of information among the 
agencies and better networking).   
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The second metric is network diameter. The formal authority network has the value of 
7. This score means that the longest distances between actors in the network is seven steps 
away, a score characteristic of centralized networks. In contrast, a less centralized network 
would have a lower score and would suggest faster information diffusion within the network 
(Samozain, 2013). 
The formal authority network has a value of 4.96 for the average distance metric. 
It means that the average distance among the nodes within the network is relatively large. 
Due to the distance, it suggests a lengthy communication process to diffuse information 
throughout the network which is very characteristic of hierarchies.  
The last metric is compactness, a variation of what is known as cohesion. Cohesion 
equals the proportion of all pairs of actors that can either directly (e.g. a friend) or indirectly 
(e.g. a friend of a friend) reach one another. This analysis uses compactness analysis which is 
simply one minus the respective fragmentation score (Everton, 2012, p. 138).7 In the case of 
this formal authority network, the network has a cohesion score of 1.00 since there are no 
isolates or disconnected clusters. Compactness differs from cohesion in that it weights the 
cohesion score by the average (path) distance between all pairs of actors in the network. So, if 
there are two networks where 100 percent of the nodes are directly or indirectly connected to 
one another, but the average path distance is 1.5 in one and 2.0 in the other, the cohesion score 
for both networks will be the same, but the first network’s compactness score will be greater 
than the second’s (Everton, 2014). The scores were calculated using UCINET and the results 
                                                 
77 Network fragmentation refers to the degree of fragmentation that takes place within a network 




Node Count 413 
Density 0.007 
Diameter 7 
Average Distance 4.96 
Compactness 0.227 
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for the formal authority network is 0.227 for compactness score. This score might indicate that 
the formal authority network is fairly compact in its coordination.    
2. Centralization 
The metrics for centralization are shown in Table 13. These metrics are measuring 
a network in order to determine its level of centralization. Based on the metrics, the 
formal authority network has the characteristics of a fairly centralized network as would 
be expected with the NAO form of governance, with the IMSCB as administrator, as 
described in Chapter II.   
Table 13.   The centralization scores for the formal authority network. 
  Metrics 
Formal authority 
network 
Degree Centralization 0.106 
Degree Std. Dev. 0.011 
Betweenness Centralization 0.621 
Betweenness Std. Dev. 0.048 
Closeness Centralization 0.287 
Closeness Std. Dev. 0.029 
 
3. Centrality 
Centrality analysis looks for the central actor within a network based on the 
various measures of centrality. The central actor in a network has control over 
information resources and acts as the network’s coordinator. Moreover, a coordinator of 
the network should be able to collect and distribute information to the whole network 
effectively and efficiently. In the case of Indonesian maritime domain, the government 
has appointed the IMSCB as the network administrator based on the decree (Perpres, 
2005). For that reason, IMSCB should be the center of gravity for the network in 
accordance with its role as the coordinator to ensure the network is running well. 
However, a very different picture emerges as seen in figures 38–40 below. The formal 
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authority network does not pivot around the IMSCB.   This suggests a serious issue given 
the central role of the IMSCB as the legitimate coordinator of the maritime network.    
Table 14 illustrates the 15 top actors in the whole network with the highest value of 
degree, betweenness, and closeness centrality. The formal authority network recognizes the 
Eastern Fleet (Navy Eastern Fleet Command) with the highest degree centrality score and Navy 
HQ with the highest betweenness and closeness value. Moreover, the centrality measure puts 
the Navy’s field offices as the central actors within the network. Table 14 provides the 
measurements for the Navy as the central actor of network in the formal authority network (see 
Figures 38–40). Despite the mandate that identifies IMSCB as the maritime network 
coordinator, the measurement of the network shows otherwise. In fact, the Navy holds the 
central role in the current maritime network.  
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Table 14.   Top 15 actors in terms of degree, betweenness, and closeness centrality scores in 
formal authority network (Results were calculated using ORA SNA software). 
Formal Authority Network  
Degree Centrality  Betweenness Centrality  Closeness Centrality  
EASTERN FLEET   NAVY HQ NAVY HQ 
0.112 0.63 0.348 
POLICE HQ IMSCB HQ EASTERN FLEET 
0.078 0.479 0.324 
WESTERN FLEET  EASTERN FLEET  WESTERN FLEET 
0.068 0.352 0.306 
IMSCB HQ DITGEN PSDKP IMSCB HQ 
0.053 0.274 0.305 
 PSDKP BASE JKT WESTERN FLEET Naval Air Base Manado 
0.053 0.256 0.299 
Naval Air Base Juanda POLICE HQ Naval Air Base Juanda 
0.039 0.145 0.298 
Naval Base Tarempa  PSDKP BASE JKT Naval Air Base Kupang 
0.034 0.099 0.291 
Naval Air Base Manado Naval Air Base Tg. Pinang Naval Air Base Biak 
0.034 0.09 0.289 
Naval Base Dabo Singkep Naval Air Base Manado Naval Air Base Tanjung 
Pinang 
0.032 0.086 0.289 
Naval Base Lhokseumawe Naval Air Base Juanda Naval Air Base Aru 
0.032 0.076 0.289 
NAVY HQ Naval Air Base Jakarta Naval Air Base Tual 
0.032 0.069 0.288 
Naval Base Batam  PSDKP Station Bitung Naval Air Base Jakarta 
0.029 0.048 0.288 
Naval Base Dumai PSDKP Station Pontianak Naval Air Base Matak 
0.029 0.048 0.283 
Main Naval Base VII Kupang Naval Base Dabo Singkep Naval Air Base Sabang 
0.029 0.043 0.283 
Naval Base Banjarmasin PSDKP StationTual Naval Base Tegal 
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V. DISCUSSION 
The previous chapter analyzed the current Indonesian maritime network. The link 
analysis illustrated the connections among the maritime agencies and their authorities, 
noting the overlapping jurisdictions especially in the case of incident investigations and 
handling. The geospatial analysis located hotspots in the Indonesian maritime domain 
that require more attention and possibly the addition of additional branch offices. The 
temporal analysis identified patterns of incidents occurring at sea and social network 
analysis described the current network structure and some of its limitations.  
Taken together, these analyses have prompted a search for alternative network 
structures to enhance network performance in the maritime domain. We offer two 
possibilities beyond the current structure:  a regional network structure that forms clusters 
based on the geographical proximity; and a sea-lane network structure that clusters 
agencies based on the three Indonesian Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC).           
A. REGIONALLY CLUSTERED NETWORK 
The regionally clustered network (Figure 41) is based on geographical proximity 
among the maritime stakeholders. They are clustered around the nearest IMSCB Information 
center in the HQ, Maritime Regional Control Centers (MRCCs), and the Regional Control 
Centers (RCCs). The IMSCB’s information centers are then connected to each other to form 
‘chain’ network. All of the MRCCs and RCCs are connected directly to the IMSCB HQ as the 
overall data coordinator. The picture is the whole network structure that shows the main nodes 
of the IMSCB’s information processing centers that form a chain. 
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Figure 41.  Indonesian maritime regionally clustered network. 
Similar to the formal authority network, the regionally clustered network uses the same 
basic topographical metrics of centralization, and centrality. The results of these analyses are 
















Table 16.   The centralization scores for regionally clustered network. 
 
  Metrics 
Regionally clustered 
network 
Degree Centralization 0.188 
Degree Std. Dev. 0.016 
Betweenness Centralization 0.775 
Betweenness Std. Dev. 0.045 
Closeness Centralization 0.509 















Node Count 413 
Density 0.005 
Diameter 4 







Table 17.   Top 15 actors in terms of degree, betweenness, and closeness centrality scores in 
regionally clustered network (Results were calculated using ORA SNA software). 
 
Regionally clustered Network  
Degree Centrality  Betweenness Centrality  Closeness Centrality  
IMSCB HQ IMSCB HQ IMSCB HQ 
0.192 0.779 0.553 
RCC Karang Asem RCC Karang Asem RCC Karang Asem 
0.136 0.247 0.417 
RCC TBK RCC TBK RCC TBK 
0.104 0.191 0.407 
MRCC Batam MRCC Batam RCC Tarakan 
0.095 0.171 0.406 
RCC Tarakan RCC Tarakan RCC Kupang 
0.087 0.161 0.401 
RCC Kupang RCC Kupang MRCC Batam 
0.073 0.133 0.4 
RCC Aceh RCC Aceh RCC Tual 
0.066 0.118 0.391 
MRCC Manado MRCC Manado MRCC Manado 
0.058 0.103 0.388 
RCC Tual RCC Tual RCC Aceh 
0.058 0.098 0.387 
MRCC Ambon RCC Kema RCC Natuna 
0.049 0.083 0.383 
RCC Kema MRCC Ambon RCC Kema 
0.049 0.083 0.381 
RCC Sambas RCC Sambas MRCC Ambon 
0.046 0.081 0.38 
RCC Natuna RCC Natuna RCC Sambas 
0.039 0.066 0.372 
RCC Jayapura RCC Jayapura RCC Jayapura 
0.027 0.043 0.369 
RCC Merauke RCC Merauke RCC Merauke 




Figure 42.  Regionally clustered network degree centrality. 
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Figure 43.  Regionally clustered network betweenness centrality. 
 
Figure 44.  Regionally clustered network closeness centrality. 
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B. SEA-LANE CLUSTERED NETWORK 
Indonesia has three SLOCs that connect the northern with the southern waters, mainly 
from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. The second network structure illustrated in Figure 42 is 
taken from the “connected cluster” network (Gibbons, 2007). The basis of this structure is the 
location of Indonesian main SLOC. For that reason, the network is named the sea-lane 
clustered network. This structure is similar to the regional network structure in which the 
IMSCB’s information centers are the hubs of the organizational clusters. But in this case, the 
IMSCB positions its resources along the three main Indonesian SLOCs. The stakeholders’ 
branches are connected to the closest IMSCB’s centers. All of the MRCCs and RCCs that 
create clusters in each SLOC then connect to each other—creating a mesh connection. Finally, 
every MRCC at the core of each cluster is coordinating with the IMSCB HQ Control 
Command Center (Puskodal). Figure 42 illustrates the structure. 
Figure 45.  Indonesia maritime sea-lane clustered network.  
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With the similar analysis tools these are the results for the sea lanes based network 
structure. 





   
Table 19.    
Table 20.   The centralization scores sea-lane clustered network. 
 
  Metrics 
Sea-lane clustered 
network 
Degree Centralization 0.158 
Degree Std. Dev. 0.015 
Betweenness Centralization 0.736 
Betweenness Std. Dev. 0.057 
Closeness Centralization 0.326 

















Node Count 413 
Density 0.005 
Diameter 6 







Table 21.   Top 15 actors in terms of degree, betweenness, and closeness centrality scores in 
sea-lane clustered network (Results were calculated using ORA SNA software). 
 
Sea-lane clustered Network  
Degree Centrality  Betweenness Centrality  Closeness Centrality  
RCC Karang Asem IMSCB HQ IMSCB HQ 
0.163 0.743 0.399 
IMSCB HQ MRCC Batam MRCC Batam 
0.129 0.485 0.349 
RCC TBK MRCC Ambon MRCC Manado 
0.107 0.433 0.34 
MRCC Ambon MRCC Manado MRCC Ambon 
0.104 0.423 0.337 
MRCC Batam RCC Karang Asem DITGEN SEA Transport 
0.1 0.287 0.285 
RCC Kupang RCC TBK DITGEN PSDKP 
0.092 0.185 0.285 
RCC Tarakan RCC Kupang Custom HQ 
0.087 0.158 0.285 
RCC Aceh RCC Tarakan Regional Marine Police 
Banten 
0.07 0.154 0.285 
RCC Tual RCC Aceh Regional Marine Police Jabar 
0.056 0.118 0.285 
RCC Sambas RCC Tual Regional Marine Police 
Jateng 
0.044 0.09 0.285 
RCC Natuna RCC Sambas Regional Marine Police 
Lampung 
0.041 0.067 0.285 
MRCC Manado RCC Natuna Regional Marine Police Metro 
Jaya 
0.039 0.062 0.285 
RCC Jayapura RCC Jayapura Regional Marine Police South  
0.032 0.043 0.285 
RCC Merauke RCC Merauke WESTERN FLEET 
0.024 0.029 0.285 
RCC Kema RCC Kema Naval Base Banten 


























Figure 47.  Sea-lane clustered network betweenness centrality. 
 
Figure 48.  Sea-lane clustered network closeness centrality. 
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C. COMPARISON OF THE THREE NETWORK STRUCTURES 
The current Indonesian formal authority network is compared with the two 
alternative network structures in Table 21 below using the basic topographical metrics.  







The formal authority network has a 0.007 density score. Meanwhile the other two have 
the same score of 0.005 for regional and sea-lane networks. The values of the second and third 
suggest the connections of these two alternatives would create fewer connections reducing the 
information sharing.   
On the diameter metric comparison, the regionally clustered network has the shortest 
diameter with the value of (4) in comparison with the formal network that has the value of (7) 
and the sea-lane network with the value of (6). With the diameter value that is almost half of 
the formal authority network, the regionally clustered network is the least centralized network 
among these forms because the longest distance between actors in the network is only four 
steps away, ensuring that information would travel faster among the agencies.   
The scores of the average distance of these networks are 4.96, 3.374, and 4.285, 
respectively, for the formal authority network, regionally clustered network, and sea-lane 
clustered network. The regionally clustered network has the shortest average geodesic distance. 
Therefore, the information distribution and coordination process in the regionally clustered 
network is likely to be faster, more efficient, and more effective.  
The calculation of the three previous metrics has shown that the regionally clustered 









Node Count 413 413 413 
Density 0.007 0.005 0.005 
Diameter 7 4 6 
Average Distance 4.96 3.374 4.285 
Compactness 0.227 0.313 0.266 
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0.313, and 0.266 for formal, regionally clustered, and sea-lane clustered network, respectively. 
The regionally clustered network has the highest compactness score which suggests this 
structure would be the most cohesive of the three structures. 
The table below illustrates the comparison of the centralization metrics of the three 
networks (see Table 22). From the comparison scores, the betweenness centralization scores 
(0.621, 0.775, and 0.736 for formal, regionally clustered, and sea-lane clustered network 
respectively) reveal a mixed pattern. For example, in terms of degree centralization, the 
regionally clustered network is more decentralized. However, in terms of betweenness 
centralization, it is more centralized. Meanwhile, in terms of closeness centralization, regionally 
clustered network has the highest value.  
Table 23.    The centralization scores comparison for three networks. 








Degree Centralization 0.106 0.188 0.158 
Degree Std. Dev. 0.011 0.016 0.015 
Betweenness 
Centralization 
0.621 0.775 0.736 
Betweenness Std. Dev. 0.048 0.045 0.057 
Closeness Centralization 0.287 0.509 0.326 
Closeness Std. Dev. 0.029 0.034 0.028 
 
From the comparison of these networks, the average score of the regionally clustered 
network is higher than the other networks (see Table 22). In five out of six measures the 
regionally clustered network has the higher scores for all metrics (except for betweenness 
standard deviation with 0.048, 0.045, and 0.057 for formal authority, regionally clustered, and 
sea-lane clustered networks, respectively). This result suggests that the regionally clustered 
network is the most centralized among these networks and, furthermore, has the potential to 
reinforce the IMSCB’s vital role in maritime coordination. 
To explore this potential, we compare the centrality metrics among the three 
network structures in the Table 23 below. As previously stated in chapter IV, the formal 
authority network points out the Navy is the central player in the maritime domain based 
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on centrality analysis. However, the regionally clustered network identifies IMSCB HQ 
as the actor with the highest score on all centrality measures, and all of the 15 top ranked 
actors on all metrics are the IMSCB’s branch offices. For the sea- lane clustered network, 
IMSCB has the highest score for betweenness and closeness, and the RCC Karang Asem 
is the actor with the highest degree centrality. Additionally, on the degree and 
betweenness centrality metrics the IMSCB’s branch offices all rank as the top 15 actors, 
while on closeness centrality, it is all maritime agencies. 
The scores in Table 23 show the IMSCB as the central actor in the regionally 
clustered network structure. The sea-lane clustered network identifies IMSCB’s 
betweenness (0.743) and closeness value (0.399) as relatively high, but IMSCB’s 
centrality score on the regionally clustered network structure is higher (0.779 for 
betweenness and 0.553 for closeness) than the sea-lane clustered network. In short, 











Table 24.   Comparison of top 15 actors in terms of degree, betweenness, and closeness 
centrality scores comparison for three networks (Results were calculated using 




Based on the measurement of each network structure, the regionally clustered 
network structure comes up as the most favorable structure to support coordination and 
information-sharing process in the Indonesian maritime network. The regionally clustered 
network structure has several advantages that could benefit the Indonesian maritime 
network: the distance among agencies is shorter which could  shorten the information 
spreading time; the less spread-out network has faster information diffusion within the 
network; the shortest geodesic distance is for more efficient and effective for information 
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distribution; the highest compactness score means the cohesiveness of the network is also 
high; the most centralized score suggests the network is more centralized compared to the 
other alternatives; and the central actor in the regionally clustered network structure is 
IMSCB and its branch offices that align with the IMSCB’s task as the coordinator of the 
maritime network.  
Moreover, the regionally clustered network  aligned with the Maritime Domain 
Awareness (MDA) system developed in the United States after 9/11 (U.S. Coast Guard, 
2005) and newly proposed in Indonesia through the idea of the Indonesian navy 
(Marsetio, 2014, pp. 54–61). The purpose of the information such as the MDA is to 
increase the maritime security through the diffusion of information to all maritime 
agencies in order to increase the awareness of the incidents that occur in the maritime 
domain.   
The role of IMSCB also changes in a regionally clustered network. Connecting 
maritime agencies that are geographically adjacent to each other, the IMSCB would act 
as the hub within the clusters. All maritime agencies that are already divided into clusters 
will then forward any significant information that they gathered in the field directly to the 
IMSCB branch office in the vicinity. The IMSCB offices then would disseminate the 
information to the agencies in each cluster under them and also coordinate with the 
neighboring hub in other clusters. This system then would be useful for incidents that 
take place in areas between the two clusters. The hubs in the regionally clustered network 
structure will then end up in the IMSCB HQ as the main hub of the system.  
For the reason that all IMSCB branch offices hold higher scores of centrality 
compared to the other agencies of this network, the diffusion and collection of 
information could reach the agencies faster in comparison to the other structural 
alternatives. This pattern of information dissemination would enable the agencies to 
respond more promptly. Furthermore, this structure allows widespread information 
gathering system that is not limited to particular agencies, but involves all resources in 
the field. This system stands to l benefit the whole network since the information 
gathering resources are spread along the archipelago.  
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D. RESOURCES ALLOCATION IN A REGIONALLY CLUSTERED 
NETWORK STRUCTURE 
There are other advantages in creating a regionally clustered network structure. First, 
based on the results of the link analysis, we are able to clear up the overlapping jurisdictions 
that create complications among the agencies in the maritime domain. Secondly, based on the 
results of the geospatial and temporal analysis, we are able to deploy operations more 
efficiently and effectively.  
1. Link Analysis 
Link Analysis shows the connection between the maritime agencies and their 
authorities in the maritime domain based on the specific government regulations and 
mandates to the maritime agencies. Moreover, link analysis identifies the overlapping 
jurisdictions and authorities among the maritime agencies that in some types of incidents 
at sea, could be handled by more than one agency, resulting in inefficient and ineffective 
use of the agencies’ resources. The authorities’ identification then are related to the 
hotspot areas from the geospatial analysis in order to identify which agencies are needed 
in certain hotspot areas. 
The distribution of the maritime agencies in the archipelago seems to be 
concentrated in the western part of Indonesia, especially in the Malacca and Singapore 
Straits, and the Northern part of Java Island (see Figure 49). This map illustrates the 
disparity of maritime agencies between the western and eastern parts of Indonesia. 
Meanwhile, SLOCs are located both in western and eastern Indonesia. This particular 





Figure 49.  Indonesian maritime agencies dispersion map. 
In relation to the hotspot areas provided by the geospatial analysis, there are 
several hotspots with an abundance of agencies. However, there are many areas that lack 
of agencies to monitor activities at sea let alone to handle the incidents that occur in these 
areas. For example, on the one hand, the Navy’s resources are spread widest in the 
archipelago, but the Navy does not have the authorities to address all maritime issues. 
There are some issues that need to be addressed by the appropriate agencies. On the other 
hand, the KPLP (Coastal Unit) has only several agencies in the western part of Indonesia. 
Meanwhile the violations in which only KPLP has the right to process are occuring all 
over the archipelago. Table 24 illustrates the authorities of the maritime agencies 
involved in the maritime operation at sea.  
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Table 25.   The authorities of maritime agencies for several types of violations.  
Violation Type IMSCB NAVY MARINE POLICE CUSTOM KPLP PSDKP 
Armed Robbery   




   
Boundary Violation   
   
Environmental Pollution   
   
Human Trafficking   
   
Illegal Fishing  





   




Illicit Sea Treasure Exploration   
   
Smuggling    
  
 
2. Geospatial Analysis 
Spatial analysis displays the incident hotspots that occur in Indonesian territorial 
waters. The hotspot areas are categorized into several types:  accidents at sea and violations at 
sea. These are sub-divided into ten sub-types of armed robbery, asylum seeker, boundary 
violation, environmental pollution, human trafficking, illegal fishing, illegal logging inadequate 
documents, smuggling, and illicit sea treasure exploration.   
These hotspots are then used to identify the areas in the maritime domain that 
require more attention, since some hotspots lack the agencies with appropriate authorities 
to conduct investigations and handle incidents. The government can fill these gaps by 
establishing related maritime agencies in the hotspot areas to address security concerns. 
However, the following guidance should be considered tentative. Current observations 
are based on limited data and most likely do not provide a complete picture of the 
maritime domain incidents and accidents. Analyses and the recommendations will likely 
change as data collection processes improve in the future.   
Accidents at sea are concentrated in the western part of Indonesia where the 
maritime agencies are quite sufficient. The high number of accidents could be caused by 
several factors: bad weather, inadequate safety precautions, and the violation of the safety 
regulations. These factors are independent of the maritime agencies in the areas. 
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However, the enforcement of safety regulations might need more attention in order to 
address the high number of accidents at sea. 
Armed robbery takes places in areas in which the maritime agencies are also quite 
abundant. One issue that needs exploration is how well all the agencies involved and 
integrate their activities to avoid overlapping responsibilities. In addition, lax law 
enforcement toward the perpetrators at sea and insufficient precautions on shore are 
likely to contributing to the number of these types of violations (ReCAAP,2013).  
Asylum seeking is a unique type of violation. Indonesia is typically not the final 
destination for the perpetrators, but Australia is.   Looking at these hotspots, it appears 
that the immigration agency that has the authority to address this violation does not have 
the resources to go off shore. For that reason, the immigration office has to coordinate 
agencies that have with seagoing resources. This is especially the case for the asylum 
seeker hotspot situated in the southern part of Indonesia. The area does not have many 
maritime agencies nor do they have easily accessible resources. More resources are 
needed in this region to handle the violations.     
Boundary violations are happening in the border areas. However, based on the 
hotspot analysis, the violations are quite distant from the closest agencies. From this data, 
it would appear that it would be more prudent to place more agencies closer to the 
hotspot area than to continue to rely on ships with limited range to patrol the area.   
Environmental pollution hotspot areas are spread out in several parts of Indonesia. 
On the Northeast of Sumatra apparently the number of the maritime agencies is sufficient 
to address the incidents, although there are still legal and environmental enforcement 
issues. In other areas, even though some agencies exist, they have neither the capabilities 
nor resources to tackle this type of problem since the agencies presence is normally only 
in the form of small outposts.     
Human trafficking is a serious transnational crime that requires prompt handling 
and response. The hotspot analysis indicates that some of the locations have sufficient 
maritime agencies but others lack them. The dispersion of agencies’ resources towards 
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the most serious hotspot areas, around Kupang and Surabaya waters, would be an 
important first step in suppressing the human trafficking in these areas.     
Illegal fishing is a common type of violation in Indonesia with its vast sea areas. 
The high numbers of violations indicate that either the perpetrators are increasing or the 
maritime agencies are losing their grip on the situation. Nevertheless, in the western part 
of Indonesia the numbers of agencies are somewhat equal to the number of illegal fishing 
incidents except in the Natuna islands that requires more resources at sea. The eastern 
part of Indonesia also appears to need more resources and patrol operation to suppress the 
number of these violations.    
Illegal logging is taking place in the areas where minimum resources are located, 
especially in eastern Indonesia. The initial points normally are Sumatra and Borneo as the 
primary producer of logs. Considering what the hotspots show, more operational 
deployments are needed to monitor the areas.   
Inadequate documents are surfacing near the ports as ships require documents to 
go offshore. The maritime agencies in the hotspots are required to deploy more patrols 
ships in the harbor area and to be attentive to ships going in and out of the ports.   
Smuggling hotspots normally occur in the border areas. This type of violation 
requires rigorous patrol operation in the hotspot areas. It would appear that the agencies 
in these hotspots are sufficient to address the issue of smuggling.  
Illicit sea treasure exploration is only happening in very specific areas that are 
assumed to hold high-value assets. The areas are also quite small. However, it takes 
intensive operational deployments in order to decrease the violations. In addition, the 
numbers of agencies and resources to handle this type of violation are deemed 




3. Temporal Analysis 
The result of temporal analysis enables maritime agencies under the coordination 
of IMSCB to deploy more effective and efficient operations based on the peak time of 
incidents at sea. However, given the sparseness of the data, there are only several 
violation could be examined using temporal analysis method. 
Accidents at sea pattern shows that the authorities should be attentive at the 
beginning of the year, as the number of accidents is very high then. Meanwhile, on a day-
to-day basis, accidents appear to be spreading widely during the weekdays and 
decreasing slightly on the weekend days (see Figure 50 below). 
 
Figure 50.  Accidents at sea time wheel (Data from 2008–2013).  
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For most Violations at sea, there is apparently no significant pattern to guide 
agency operations. Most violation patterns are scattered. However, analyzing illegal 
fishing on the monthly basis and inadequate documents on a weekly basis shows some 
violation patterns. These reveal times that could guide operational deployments of 
maritime agencies.  
Overall, incidents are more likely to happen from February until November with 
the peak occurring between March and April. The lowest numbers of incidents occur 
between December and January. For the day-of-the-week category, Sunday and Monday 
are the days with the lowest numbers of incidents. Meanwhile, the peak takes place on 
Tuesday to Thursday as shown in the Figure 51 below. 
 
Figure 51.  Violations at sea time wheel (Data from 2008–2013).  
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Temporal analysis indicates the distinct time that accidents and violations at sea 
may occur. With more significant numbers of data, the maritime agencies may identify 
the time pattern of these occurrences and manage their operational deployment based on 
the temporal analysis of information. Instead of deploying and wasting the assets without 
clear tasks, temporal analysis enables the maritime agencies to operate based on the 
critical month-of-the-year and day-of-the-week basis that enables them to save scarce 
resources.      
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VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The complexity of the problem in the Indonesian maritime domain is putting the 
nation in a vulnerable position. The matter of maritime security, especially in an 
archipelagic nation such as Indonesia, should be a top priority that requires immediate 
action due to the imminent nature of the threats. Indonesia’s dependence on its maritime 
sector should be balanced with good maritime governance of the domain.  
This study is an effort to provide better alternatives to existing maritime security 
management. Its results are just some of the considerations for policy-makers in making 
improvements in the Indonesian maritime domain. Thus, it should not be taken as a 
“silver bullet” for all Indonesian maritime security issues, especially considering the 
complex nature of the maritime domain. It is merely providing additional insights for the 
government, in this case the IMSCB and other maritime agencies, drawn from our social 
network analysis and visual analytic methods used in this study.    
The data included in this study are based on the data collection of IMSCB that 
came from reports of incidents and arrests. The data collection process is passive in 
nature in that the maritime agencies are not searching for data in the field. Instead, data 
collection is sourced from the reports that came to the agencies and channeled up to the 
IMSCB’s data and information processing center. Without a doubt, there are still many 
unrecorded data that have not been successfully collected and reported to the information 
center. The incomplete may likely have skewed the results of the analysis. Nevertheless, 
the methodologies used in this study suggest the way forward when better data collection 
strategies have been developed and employed. 
A. SUMMARY 
This study has determined that the existing network structure does not adequately 
support the information-sharing process in order to increase maritime domain awareness and 
security. The current formal authority network does not distribute information throughout the 
network and coordinate it effectively. The lag-time in information diffusion also creates delays 
in the response time to address incidents that occur in the domain. 
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For that reason, this study has proposed another network structure for better 
coordination and information sharing within the Indonesian maritime network. The regionally 
clustered network structure, as described in the previous chapters, has advantages that we 
believe can improve coordination and information dissemination within the maritime domain. 
It also supports the IMSCB mandate that makes it the sole coordinator of the maritime security 
issues and the central actor within the network.   
The geospatial analysis reveals the hotspot areas that require more attention from the 
maritime agencies in a regionally based network. It also identifies what maritime agencies are 
needed in other areas in order to handle particular incidents. However, the accuracy and 
significance of these hotspot maps are highly dependent on the quality of the data being 
collected. Until we have a more robust data collection process, the results should be treated as 
tentative.      
The temporal analysis enables us to chart incidents at sea over time. The results enable 
the regionally-based maritime agencies to identify the best times to deploy their resources and 
to conduct operations at sea. As with the other analyses in this study, temporal analysis is also 
highly dependent on the quality of the data collected and the results must be treated as tentative. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings of this study, we offer several recommendations.   First, the 
maritime domain requires accurate and reliable data regarding incidents at sea. The 
existing system does not provide a complete picture of the incidents, e.g. when and when 
they are occurring. Indonesia needs an active data collection process. The existing data, 
which this study extracted from IMSCB information center, is still lacking in source 
details and reliability. The government, in this case, is the IMSCB as the coordinator of 
the maritime security network, needs to improve the data gathering process and include 
all maritime stakeholders, not just the government agencies. Instead of passively waiting 
for incident reports, maritime assets should actively collect data in each region’s area of 
responsibility. This would be an important first step is gathering more reliable data and 
information.  
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In support of the previous recommendation, the proposed regionally-clustered 
network structure could be used to improve the network’s overall data collection and 
distribution processes. The regionally based structure, as previously noted, is capable of 
delivering information faster and coordinating throughout the network by using all nodes 
in the system to collect data and enhance coordination. Moreover, through the IMSCB 
branches that are acting as hubs, the collected information is quickly diffused to the entire 
network for better information sharing.   
The Indonesian maritime agencies should use geospatial and temporal analysis to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of resources distribution in their operational 
deployments. Geospatial analysis is providing hotspot area identification so maritime 
agencies can focus their security efforts as well as identify areas that requires more 
security resources and services. Temporal analysis reveals the incidents’ patterns based 
on time. With further interpretation, this analysis could determine the better time to 
conduct sea patrols and maritime security operations.       
This study has identified methodologies for analyzing the Indonesian maritime 
domain and the networks its agencies and stakeholder have created. Our analysis also has 
identified improvements we believe are needed to meet emerging challenges and threats 
in the domain.   While our study does not aim to address all maritime issues that are 
intertwined with many other aspects in our complex and challenging environment, we 
offer our recommendations as merely one effort to advance maritime governance and to 
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APPENDIX. LIST OF INDONESIAN MARITIME AGENCIES 
A. IMSCB 
Index ORGANIZATION LEVEL 
1 IMSCB HQ HQ 
2 Task Force I Batam Task Force 
3 MRCC Batam MRCC 
4 RCC Aceh  RCC 
5 RCC Sambas RCC 
6 RCC TBK RCC 
7 RCC Natuna RCC 
8 Task Force II Manado Task Force 
9 MRCC Manado MRCC 
10 RCC Kema RCC 
11 RCC Tarakan RCC 
12 RCC Karang Asem RCC 
13 Task Force III Ambon Task Force 
14 MRCC Ambon MRCC 
15 RCC Kupang RCC 
16 RCC Tual RCC 
17 RCC Jayapura RCC 
18 RCC Merauke RCC 
 
B. NAVY 
Index Organization Level  Index Organization Level 
















4 Naval Base Sabang Naval Base  24 Naval Post Sinaboy Naval 
Post 
5 Naval Post Suka Karya Naval Post  25 Naval Post Muntai Naval 
Post 

















Index Organization Level  Index Organization Level 








12 Naval Post Sigli Naval Post  32 Naval Post Singkil Naval 
Post 






















18 Naval Post Pulau Jemur Naval Post  38 Naval Base Sibolga Naval 
Base 




20 Naval Post Bengkalis Naval Post  40 Naval Post Natal Naval 
Post 
41 Naval Post Teluk Dalam Naval Post  84 Naval Post Sugi Naval 
Post 












45 Naval Post Muko-muko Naval Post  88 Naval Post Jemaja Naval 
Post 




















50 Naval Post Jambi Naval Post  93 Naval Base Ranai Naval 
Base 




52 Naval Base Banten Naval Base  95 Naval Post Pulau Naval 
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Index Organization Level  Index Organization Level 
Subi Post 




54 Naval Post Pulau 
Tempurung 
Naval Post  97 Naval Post Midai Naval 
Post 




56 Naval Post Binuangen Naval Post  99 Naval Post Penangi Naval 
Post 
57 Naval Post Sumur Naval Post  100 Naval Post Sedanau Naval 
Post 




















63 Naval Post Kota Agung Naval Post  106 Naval Post Cempa Naval 
Post 
64 Naval Post Labuan 
Maringgai 
Naval Post  107 Naval Post Pancur Naval 
Post 








67 Naval Base Bangka-
Belitung 













70 Naval Post Pulau 
Mendanau 
Naval Post  113 Naval Post Leho Naval 
Post 
71 Naval Post Pangkal Balam Naval Post  114 Naval Post Moro Naval 
Post 








74 Naval Air Base Jakarta Naval Air 
Base 




75 Main Naval Base IV Tg. Main Naval  118 Naval Post Naval 
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Index Organization Level  Index Organization Level 
Pinang Base Kendawangan Post 
76 Naval Post Lagoi Naval Post  119 Naval Post Temajo Naval 
Post 
77 Naval Post Berakit Naval Post  120 Naval Post Paloh Naval 
Post 




79 Naval Post Tanjung 
Sangkuang 
Naval Post  122 Naval Base Mentigi Naval 
Base 










82 Naval Post Pulau Nipa Naval Post  125 EASTERN FLEET Fleet 
HQ 









128 Naval Post Kieces Naval Post  172 Naval Post Bahaur Naval 
Post 












132 Naval Post Jepara Naval Post  176 Naval Post Kintab Naval 
Post 
133 Naval Post Rembang Naval Post  177 Naval Base Palu Naval 
Base 




135 Naval Base Denpasar Naval Base  179 Naval Post Luwuk Naval 
Post 
136 Naval Post Pulau Nusa 
Penida 
Naval Post  180 Naval Post Parimo Naval 
Post 




138 Naval Post Celukan 
Bawang 
Naval Post  182 Naval Post Ampana Naval 
Post 




140 Naval Base Banyuwangi Naval Base  184 Naval Post Tanjung Naval 
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Index Organization Level  Index Organization Level 
Pelayar Post 
























147 Naval Post Wonokerto Naval Post  191 Naval Post Bontang Naval 
Post 









150 Naval Post Pagerungan Naval Post  194 Naval Post Lirang Naval 
Post 
151 Naval Base Malang Naval Base  195 Naval Post Wetar Naval 
Post 
152 Naval Post Sendang Biru Naval Post  196 Naval Post Romang Naval 
Post 
153 Naval Base Yogyakarta Naval Base  197 Naval Post Kisar Naval 
Post 




155 Naval Air Base Juanda Naval Air 
Base 
 199 Naval Post Boking Naval 
Post 
















159 Naval Base Balikpapan Naval Base  203 Naval Post Oepoli Naval 
Post 
160 Naval Post Anggana Naval Post  204 Naval Post Ende Naval 
Post 
161 Naval Post Kampung Baru Naval Post  205 Naval Post Mbay Naval 
Post 




163 Naval Base Kendari Naval Base  207 Naval Base Naval 
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Index Organization Level  Index Organization Level 
Mataram Base 




165 Naval Post Bau-bau Naval Post  209 Naval Post Bima Naval 
Post 








168 Naval Post Konawe Utara Naval Post  212 Naval Post Calabai Naval 
Post 








215 Naval Post Sabu Naval Post  259 Naval Post Sarana Naval 
Post 
216 Naval Post Dana Naval Post  260 Naval Post Maba Naval 
Post 








219 Naval Post Papela Naval Post  263 Naval Post Togafo Naval 
Post 
220 Naval Air Base Kupang Naval Air 
Base 






















224 Naval Base Tarakan Naval Base  268 Naval Post Sami Naval 
Post 
225 Naval Post Pulau Derawan Naval Post  269 Naval Base Biak Naval 
Base 




227 Naval Post Berau Naval Post  271 Naval Post Nabire Naval 
Post 
228 Naval Post Pulau Maratua Naval Post  272 Naval Post Serui Naval 
Post 
229 Naval Post Tanjung Batu Naval Post  273 Naval Base Sorong Naval 
Base 
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Index Organization Level  Index Organization Level 




231 Naval Base Nunukan Naval Base  275 Naval Post Bintuni Naval 
Post 
232 Naval Post Sei Pancang Naval Post  276 Naval Post Waisai Naval 
Post 














236 Naval Post Sei Taiwan Naval Post  280 Naval Post Wanam Naval 
Post 
237 Naval Post Tinabasan Naval Post  281 Naval Post Torasi Naval 
Post 
238 Naval Base Toli-toli Naval Base  282 Naval Post Bade Naval 
Post 
239 Naval Post Buol Naval Post  283 Naval Base Aru Naval 
Base 
240 Naval Post Lokodede Naval Post  284 Naval Post Benjina Naval 
Post 
241 Naval Base Tahuna Naval Base  285 Naval Base Timika Naval 
Base 




243 Naval Post Miangas Naval Post  287 Naval Post Fak-fak Naval 
Post 
244 Naval Post Tagulandang Naval Post  288 Naval Post Agats Naval 
Post 
245 Naval Post Talaud Naval Post  289 Naval Air Base Aru Naval 
Air 
Base 
246 Naval Post Pulau Siau Naval Post  
247 Naval Post Bunga Lawang Naval Post  
248 Naval Base Gorontalo Naval Base  
249 Naval Post Kwandang Naval Post  
250 Naval Base Melonguane Naval Base  
251 Naval Air Base Manado Naval Air 
Base 
 





253 Naval Post Pulau Buru Naval Post  
254 Naval Post Bula Naval Post  
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Index Organization Level  Index Organization Level 
255 Naval Base Tual Naval Base  
256 Naval Base Saumiaki Naval Base  
257 Naval Base Ternate Naval Base  
258 Naval Post Pulau Gebe Naval Post  
 
 
C. MARINE POLICE 
Index Organization Level 
1 POLRI HQ HQ 
2 Regional Marine Police NAD Regional Marine Police 
3 Regional Marine Police North 
Sumatera 
Regional Marine Police 
4 Regional Marine Police Riau Regional Marine Police 
5 Regional Marine Police South 
Sumatera 
Regional Marine Police 
6 Regional Marine Police West 
Sumatera 
Regional Marine Police 
7 Regional Marine Police Babel Regional Marine Police 
8 Regional Marine Police Jambi Regional Marine Police 
9 Regional Marine Police 
Bengkulu 
Regional Marine Police 
10 Regional Marine Police 
Lampung 
Regional Marine Police 
11 Regional Marine Police Metro 
Jaya 
Regional Marine Police 
12 Regional Marine Police West 
Java 
Regional Marine Police 
13 Regional Marine Police Banten Regional Marine Police 
14 Regional Marine Police Central 
Java 
Regional Marine Police 
15 Regional Marine Police DIY Regional Marine Police 
16 Regional Marine Police East 
Java 
Regional Marine Police 
17 Regional Marine Police Bali Regional Marine Police 
18 Regional Marine Police NTB Regional Marine Police 
19 Regional Marine Police NTT Regional Marine Police 
20 Regional Marine Police West 
Kalimantan 
Regional Marine Police 
21 Regional Marine Police Central 
Kalimantan 
Regional Marine Police 
22 Regional Marine Police South Regional Marine Police 
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Kalimantan 
23 Regional Marine Police East 
Kalimantan 
Regional Marine Police 
24 Regional Marine Police North 
Sulawesi 
Regional Marine Police 
25 Regional Marine Police 
Gorontalo 
Regional Marine Police 
26 Regional Marine Police Central 
Sulawesi 
Regional Marine Police 
27 Regional Marine Police South 
Sulawesi 
Regional Marine Police 
28 Regional Marine Police 
Southeast Sulawesi 
Regional Marine Police 
29 Regional Marine Police North 
Maluku 
Regional Marine Police 
30 Regional Marine Police Maluku Regional Marine Police 
31 Regional Marine Police Papua Regional Marine Police 
32 Regional Marine Police Riau 
Islands 
Regional Marine Police 
 
A. KPLP 
Index Organization Level 




2 Base PLP Tanjung Uban Base 
3 Base PLP Tanjung Priok Base 
4 Base PLP Tanjung Perak Base 
5 Base PLP Bitung Base 








Index Organization Level 
1 DJBC HQ HQ 
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4 Operational Base Pantoloan Operational 
Base 
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